CHARLES G. DINSMORE, APPELLANT,
v.
DIXIE A. DINSMORE, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, the former husband challenged a trial court's modification order that converted the former wife's rehabilitative alimony to permanent periodic alimony, increased child support retroactively, and required reimbursement of medical expenses. The appellate court affirmed most of the modifications but reversed the award of only two-thirds of the former wife's attorney's fees, remanding for the trial court to award the full amount or provide justification.
The court affirmed the modifications converting alimony to permanent periodic status, retroactively increasing child support, and awarding medical expense reimbursement as supported by competent substantial evidence and within the trial court's discretion. However, the court reversed the award of only two-thirds of attorney's fees and remanded for the trial court to either award the full amount or state reasons justifying the reduced award in light of the income disparity between the parties.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by converting rehabilitative alimony to permanent periodic alimony when supported by statutory grounds and case law.
[2] A trial court may retroactively increase child support obligations to the date of filing the motion for modification.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the modified award of permanent alimony”
Establishes the standard of review and the court's approval of the alimony modification
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were former spouses with two minor children. The trial court modified an earlier alimony award by converting the former wife's rehabilitat…
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal, the former husband challenged the trial court’s modification order 1) converting the former wife’s original award of rehabilitative alimony to permanent periodic alimony, 2) retroactively increasing the former husband’s child support obligation to $775.00 a month for each of the parties’ two minor children ($1,550.00 a month total), and 3) obligating the former husband to reimburse the former wife for reasonable medical expenses. The former wife cross-appealed the order awarding her two-thirds rather than the full amount of her trial attorney’s fees. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the modified award of permanent alimony, see section 61.08(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1991), and Tonnelier v. Tonnelier, 571 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); and affirm the award of an increase in child support, retroactive to the date of filing the motion for modification.
Section 61.30, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1992); Miller v. Schou, 616 So. 2d 436 (Fla.1993); Pelton v. Pelton, 617 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Likewise, we affirm the award of $4,003.15 in medical expenses, which is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.
We find merit in the former wife’s argument on cross-appeal that she is unable to pay her trial counsel’s fees.
Accordingly, we reverse the order awarding her only two-thirds of her attorney’s fees, and remand for the trial court either to award her the entire amount, or else to state reasons justifying the challenged award in light of the evidence of the former husband’s superior income and the former wife’s lack of sufficient assets (other than income from alimony payments) to pay attorney’s fees. Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano, 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla.3d DCA 1992) (given great disparity in parties’ incomes, trial court reversibly erred in ordering husband to pay only one-half rather than entire amount of wife’s attorney’s fees); Askegard v. Askegard, 584 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); White v. White, 575 So. 2d 767 (Fla.2d DCA 1991) (reversing award of only 70% of wife’s attorney’s fees and ordering husband to pay entire amount, where wife’s income was not substantial and circumstances would have required her to dip into rehabilitative alimony to pay counsel).
We do not disturb the unchallenged provisions of the modification order. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
ZEHMER, C.J., and WOLF and MICKLE, JJ., concur.
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Taylor v. Taylor, 650 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…As to the final two issues, we must reverse. The trial court awarded the former wife less than one-fourth of her attorney’s fees and costs. Because of the vast difference in the resources of these parties, this was error. See Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 623 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). We reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings as to this issue. Appellee also concedes that the trial court erred in…
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Vazquez v. Rossy Vazquez-Robelledo, 150 So. 3d 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…61.13(l)(b): But even if the $500 monthly payment requirement was properly characterized as such, we must reverse that portion of the order because there was no evidence regarding the cost of counseling and “related costs.” See Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 623 So. 2d 638, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming the award of $4003.15 in medical expenses because it was supported by competent, substantial evidence). In summary, we affirm the order on appeal with the exception of the provisions awarding the Wife monthly sup…
Authorities Cited
- Miller v. Schou, 616 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1993)
- Pelton v. Pelton, 617 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Askegard v. Askegard, 584 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano, 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Dorcas Irene Tonnelier v. Tonnelier, 571 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- White v. White, 575 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)