GENERAL STORAGE CORPORATION, RENE VELIZ, AND JUANA VELIZ, PETITIONERS,
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, IN ITS CORPORATE CAPACITY, RESPONDENT
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The court denied certiorari, accepting the FDIC's concession that factual findings in a non-jury mortgage foreclosure action would not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on a jury trial of a third-party complaint, thus preserving the petitioners' right to a jury trial.
Factual determinations in a non-jury mortgage foreclosure action have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on issues to be determined by jury in a third-party complaint against the FDIC.
[1] Factual determinations in a non-jury mortgage foreclosure action do not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on issues to be tried by jury in a third-party com…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners filed a third-party complaint against the FDIC as receiver in a mortgage foreclosure action, and the foreclosure action was scheduled for …
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PER CURIAM.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied based upon the respondent’s concession, which we accept, that any factual determinations made in the non-jury mortgage foreclosure action will have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as to any of the issues to be determined by the jury on the petitioners’ third-party complaint against the FDIC as receiver. See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 733, 162 So. 323, 329 (1935); Couch Constr. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 537 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.1989); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982); see also Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 108 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F. 2d 776, 783 (5th Cir.1989); Trigo v. FDIC, 847 F. 2d 1499 (11th Cir.1988); FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping Center, 791 F. 2d 215, 218-21 (1st Cir.1986); American Surety Co. v. Normandy State Bank, 237 Mo.App. 39, 167 S.W. 2d 436 (1943).
Given this concession, we conclude that the petitioners’ right to a jury trial on the third-party complaint was not violated below by scheduling the mortgage foreclosure action for trial before the trial on the third-party complaint. Compare Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Certiorari denied.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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R.D.J. Enters., Inc. v. Mega Bank & Charles Kantor, 600 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…mplaint against Kantor on preclusion principles because Kantor was not a party to the foreclosure action which was previously ruled on by the court. There is merit to that contention. According to General Storage Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 576 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), determinations made in an equitable action for foreclosure have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on issues to be tried before a jury in the mortgagor’s legal claim against a nonparty to the foreclosure action. In Fl…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Langley et ux. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86 (U.S. 1987)
- McGregor v. Provident Tr. Co. of Philadelphia, 119 Fla. 718 (Fla. 1935)
- Harold v. Beighley, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989)
- Spring v. Ronel Ref., Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. LA Rambla Shopping Ctr., Inc., 791 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1986)
- Trigo v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC), 847 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988)
- Couch Constr. Co. v. The Fla. Dep't OF Transp. & City of Tampa, 537 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)