JIMMIE LEE COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jimmie Lee Cooper was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment plus probation and a $250,000 fine. The Florida appellate court reversed because the trial court failed to properly determine Cooper's indigency status at the time of trial and failed to ensure his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.
Yes on both issues. The trial court erred in relying on an initial solvency determination made months earlier when Cooper's financial circumstances had materially changed due to incarceration and loss of employment. Additionally, the trial court failed to conduct the thorough inquiry required by Rule 3.111(d)(2) to ensure Cooper's waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made.
[1] A defendant's financial circumstances must be re-evaluated at subsequent stages of a criminal proceeding if they previously requested appointed counsel and were determine…
[2] A determination of non-indigency made at an early stage of a criminal proceeding does not, without repeated inquiry, constitute a waiver of the right to counsel at later…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Even had a valid initial determination of non-indigency been made, that early determination does not, without repeated inquiry, constitute a waiver of the right to counsel at later stages when the defendant appears without counsel.”
Establishes that solvency determinations must be revisited if circumstances change and the defendant later appears without counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCooper initially retained private counsel but it withdrew due to non-payment of fees. He made two unsuccessful attempts to hire other private attorney…
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THREADGILL, Judge.
Jimmie Lee Cooper was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment to be followed by fifteen years’ probation, and was fined $250,-000.00. Cooper alleges error in the trial court’s determination of solvency, and in its decision to require Cooper to proceed to jury trial pro se without first determining that he had the ability to intelligently waive counsel as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d). We agree and reverse.
The appellant initially retained private counsel who was later allowed to withdraw due to the appellant’s failure to make payments for attorney’s fees. The appellant made two additional attempts to hire private attorneys, but was unsuccessful. The appellant requested that counsel be appointed, but was determined to be solvent by a judge who was substituting .for the trial judge. This initial determination of solvency was made while the appellant was free on bond and was employed. He was subsequently remanded into custody. One month later, he appeared before the trial court at a status conference and again requested that counsel be appointed. After conducting an inquiry into his financial condition, the trial court found the appellant solvent and denied his request. The appellant made two additional requests for the appointment of counsel at subsequent court appearances, both of which were denied based upon the previous solvency determination. Thereafter, the appellant represented himself at jury trial, and was found guilty as charged.
The appellant was incarcerated for the three months immediately preceding his trial. During this time, he no longer received income from his employment. On the day of trial, the trial court immediately proceeded with jury selection. No further inquiry was made into the appellant’s financial ability to employ counsel. In fact, when the appellant renewed his request for counsel during jury selection, the trial court stated, “[w]e are not up here to rear-gue that. That’s an issue that’s been decided.” Even had a valid initial determina tion of non-indigency been made, that early determination does not, without repeated inquiry, constitute a waiver of the right to counsel at later stages when the defendant appears without counsel. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5); Enrique v. State, 408 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982).
Moreover, the record does not establish that the appellant’s implicit waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) requires a thorough inquiry into an accused’s capacity to intelligently and understanding^ waive counsel before such a waiver may be accepted. Although the record establishes that the appellant had completed three and one-half years of college, this information alone does not satisfy the trial court’s obligation. The trial court did not examine the appellant as to his background and experience, his ability to defend himself against the state’s charges, or his mental condition. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Drago v. State, 415 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Crutchfield v. State, 454 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Finally, there is no indication on the record that the appellant was apprised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Morgano v. State, 439 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); DiBartolomeo v. State, 450 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Alexander v. State, 446 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Taylor v. State, 605 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…ition, education, and lack of knowledge and experience in criminal proceedings. Further, the judge failed to warn Taylor of: the complexity of a jury trial, the dangers of self-representation, and the mandatory minimum sentence. See Cooper v. State, 576 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Smith v. State, 549 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). On the day of trial, the judge did not renew an offer of assistance of counsel. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5). Because the trial judge failed to conduct the necessary inquiries…
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Vera v. State, 689 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…ate v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla.1993). “Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) requires a thorough inquiry into an accused’s capacity to intelligently and understanding^ waive counsel before such a waiver may be accepted.” Cooper v. State, 576 So. 2d 1379, 1380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The trial court was required as part of the Faretta inquiry to apprise Vera of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and to warn him of the severity of the charge and its possible penalty. Jones v. State, 650…
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Smith v. State, 590 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…s at a later date. Mackwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). Faced with Smith’s request for counsel, the trial court should have determined whether he qualified for the services of the public defender as of that time. Cf. Cooper v. State, 576 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Accordingly, we must remand this case for a new sentencing hearing. Reversed. SCHOONOVER, C.J., and SCHEB and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Reynold Enrique v. State, 408 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. Mullett, 439 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Drago v. State, 415 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- DiBARTOLOMEO v. State, 450 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Crutchfield v. State, 454 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Alexander v. State, 446 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)