GREGORY BERNARD CRUTCHFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the conviction of Gregory Crutchfield for arson and battery. The trial court improperly forced the defendant to represent himself after cycling through three public defenders due to his conduct, without conducting a proper Faretta inquiry into his competency to self-represent.
A trial court must conduct a proper Faretta inquiry to determine whether a defendant is capable of defending himself before requiring or allowing self-representation. The trial court's mere knowledge that the defendant had filed pretrial motions does not satisfy the requirements of a true Faretta inquiry. Additionally, denying counsel at sentencing when requested violates Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5).
[1] A trial court must conduct an inquiry to determine if a defendant is capable of defending himself before requiring or allowing the defendant to represent himself.
[2] The filing of pretrial motions by a defendant does not satisfy the requirements of a Faretta inquiry.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“before a trial judge can require, or even allow, a defendant in a criminal case to represent himself, the judge must conduct an inquiry to determine whether the defendant is capable of defending himself”
Establishes the mandatory Faretta inquiry requirement that the trial court failed to conduct
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCrutchfield was incarcerated on other charges when he allegedly attempted to burn down the county jail, resulting in an arson charge. He was also char…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
While incarcerated in the county jail on other charges, appellant allegedly attempted to “burn the jail down,” which gave rise to a new charge of arson. In addition, appellant was charged with battery on two law enforcement officers.
During the course of the pretrial proceedings the court appointed three successive public defenders to represent appellant. Each was allowed to withdraw because of appellant’s conduct, which, among other things, involved the filing of a grievance against counsel with the Florida Bar, accusations of railroading and colluding with the State, as well as threats of retribution. The trial court warned appellant that he was running out of public defenders and appellant might eventually have to represent himself if his intransigence continued. Finally, when the third public defender withdrew, the trial court advised appellant that, as in baseball, "three strikes and you are out”; appellant would have to represent himself. Appellant contended he could not represent himself and wanted a lawyer; but the trial judge, no doubt fed up with appellant, refused to appoint another lawyer to represent appellant.
We are extremely sympathetic with the trial judge. It would seem that appellant had made his bed and should have been required to lie in it. However, as we understand the law in this state today, before a trial judge can require, or even allow, a defendant in a criminal case to represent himself, the judge must conduct an inquiry to determine whether the defendant is capable of defending himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Here, appellant had filed pleadings himself and argued some of them, so it might be contended that the judge already knew appellant was able. However, we do not believe that the filing of pretrial motions meets the requirements of a true Faretta inquiry. See, too, Mitchell v. State, 407 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Mansfield v. State, 430 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Smith v. State, 444 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Drago v. State, 415 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Furthermore, appellant protested that he could not represent himself; that in the future he would behave; and our review of the record indicates appellant was not really competent to represent himself. In addition to having no counsel at trial, appellant was also refused counsel at sentencing, although he requested it. This violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5).
Accordingly, with a great degree of reluctance, we are constrained to reverse appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand the cause for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, JAMES C., and PURDY, H. MARK, Associate Judges, concur.
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Cooper v. State, 576 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…d experience, his ability to defend himself against the state’s charges, or his mental condition. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Drago v. State, 415 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Crutchfield v. State, 454 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Finally, there is no indication on the record that the appellant was apprised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Morgano v. State, 439 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); DiBartolomeo v. State, 450 So. 2d 92…
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Lynnie R. Clary v. State, 818 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…and that this omission is not subject to the harmless error analysis. See State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla.1993); Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 185, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988); Crutchfield v. State, 454 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In this case, LeDuc was appointed to represent Clary on December 18, 2000, after the public defender certified a conflict. Clary filed a motion to dismiss Le-Duc on February 28, 2001 and to have the court appoint new counsel. T…
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Young v. State, 609 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…ggestion to do so, the judge failed to conduct a Faretta hearing. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We reverse. Our cases make apparent the danger of foregoing a Faretta inquiry. In Crutchfield v. State, 454 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), we expressed “extreme sympathy” with the judge’s response to a defendant’s repeated refusals to accept three appointed lawyers. Nevertheless, we reversed on account of the failure to make the appropriate inquiry, saying that we…
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Thompson, 444 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Mitchell v. State, 407 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Drago v. State, 415 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Mansfield v. State, 430 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)