LOUIS BROWN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief because the appellant failed to refile his motion within the two-year statute of limitations after his conviction became final. The court emphasized the strict adherence to procedural deadlines in post-conviction relief.
No, the motion was not timely filed. The two-year period for filing the motion expired on May 22, 1988, and the appellant filed his motion to reinstate on August 23, 1989.
[1] A motion for post-conviction relief must be filed within two years after the judgment and sentence become final, which is interpreted to mean after appellate proceedings…
[2] A motion for post-conviction relief filed more than two years after the conclusion of appellate proceedings is subject to dismissal.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Except under circumstances not applicable here, a motion for postcon-viction relief must be filed within “two years after the judgment and sentence become final.””
Establishes the general rule for the timeliness of post-conviction relief motions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Louis Brown, Jr. filed a motion for post-conviction relief. His initial motion was dismissed, and he later attempted to reinstate it. The fi…
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WENTWORTH, Senior Judge.
This is a timely appeal from successive orders denying Brown’s motion for post-conviction relief. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. We affirm because the motion below was subject to dismissal for Brown’s failure to reinstate his prematurely filed and dismissed motion for postconviction relief within two years of conviction. See Brown v. State, 488 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (affirming conviction), attempted appeal dismissed, -494 So. 2d 1149 (Fla.1986); Brown v. State, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (denying motion for existing records or acquittal), appeal dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568 (Fla.1988).
The state filed in this court a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or as procedurally barred. That motion was denied without prejudice and the state now reasserts its position in its answer brief. Except under circumstances not applicable here, a motion for postcon-viction relief must be filed within “two years after the judgment and sentence become final.” Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. That provision has been interpreted to mean that the judgment and sentence do not become final until appellate proceedings have concluded. Hilbert v. State, 540 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (date of mandate); Austin v. State, 527 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1988); Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The final step in the appellate process here occurred on May 22,1986, when this court issued its mandate. Thus, to comply with the rule, Brown must have filed his 3.850 motion before May 22, 1988. Fatal to his cause, he filed his claim for “reinstated” motion on August 23, 1989, more than 15 months after the two-year deadline. In the past, this court has declined to overlook the time requirement simply because the movant advanced his claim personally. Austin, 527 So. 2d at 868.
In addition, Brown has stated no claim that entitles him to relief, for his allegations are conclusory, inadequately alleged, lack merit, or were not raised below.
Affirmed.
SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Jones v. State, 602 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…e Court is finally determined.” In other words, a judgment and [*608] sentence become final for purposes of filing a motion for post-conviction relief when appellate proceedings have concluded, i.e., upon issuance of the mandate. See Brown v. State, 577 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla.1991); Austin v. State, 527 So. 2d 867, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988); Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Hilbert v. State, 540 So. 2d 227 (Fla.…
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Brown v. State, 617 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…(b), which requires that a motion be filed no more than two years after the judgment and sentence become final, with certain exceptions that are apparently not applicable here. In support of its argument, appellee relies primarily on Brown v. State, 577 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla.1991) (hereafter Brown) and Austin v. State, 527 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988). Appellant opposes the motion, pointing to Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Brown v. State, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Geddes v. Gudrun Margrit Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Austin v. State, 527 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Hilbert v. State, 540 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)