EDWARD EARL STURDIVANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sturdivant was convicted of cocaine possession after police entered a motel room without a warrant, based on a confidential informant's signal. The Florida appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the warrantless entry into a motel room violated the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or valid consent.
The warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. A motel room is a private dwelling entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, and absent a warrant, exigent circumstances, or valid consent from a joint occupant with authority to admit others, officers may not enter to make a felony arrest. Lewis lacked authority to consent to the entry because Sturdivant had expelled her from the room before she opened the door.
[1] A hotel or motel room is considered a private dwelling to which Fourth Amendment protections apply.
[2] A warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a lawfully occupied motel room to make a felony arrest is prohibited absent exigent circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A hotel or motel room is the private dwelling of the occupant and the constitutional protections of the fourth amendment apply to such transient guests.”
Establishes the foundational principle that motel rooms receive Fourth Amendment protection as private dwellings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputy Sheriff White received information from Sherry Lewis, a woman formerly romantically involved with Sturdivant, that he was dealing in cocaine. L…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
Edward Earl Sturdivant appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine, contending that the trial court erred in the denial of his motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.
On August 25, 1989, Deputy Sheriff White of the Charlotte County Sheriffs Department received a phone call from Sherry Lewis’ father advising that Lewis had information regarding Sturdivant’s dealing in cocaine. White met with Lewis, who had previously been romantically involved with Sturdivant. Lewis said that Sturdivant regularly dealt in cocaine and that she could set up a situation to catch him in the act of possession of cocaine. A plan was formulated in which Lewis would arrange a meeting with Sturdivant in a motel room, signal the police by an electronic device when she observed contraband, and then open the motel room door to admit the officers. Everything went according to plan, and Sturdivant was arrested in the room and charged with possession of four packets of cocaine. No part of the plan anticipated the obtaining of a search warrant or arrest warrant.
A hotel or motel room is the private dwelling of the occupant and the constitutional protections of the fourth amendment apply to such transient guests. Wassmer v. State, 565 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). There was no evidence presented which would support a theory that Lewis was a joint occupant of the room with authority to admit others. There was also no evidence of exigent circumstances requiring the entry by the officers. The fourth amendment prohibits a warrantless and nonconsensual entry of a lawfully occupied motel room for the purpose of making a felony arrest absent exigent circumstances. United States v. Standridge, 810 F. 2d 1034 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072, 107 S.Ct. 2468, 95 L.Ed.2d 877 (1987).
The state, relying on State v. Fernandez, 538 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), argues that Lewis as an invitee had implied consent to open the door and allow the officers to enter. However, Lewis testified that before she went to the door Sturdivant had twice told her to “get the H out of there,” and it was only after she inquired as to whether he really meant it that she opened the door. Obviously, Lewis no longer had implied consent to be in the room or to return once she had left. Thus, Fernandez does not apply here.
Confronted with the evidence presented in the trial court, the state now, for the first time, offers us a citizen’s arrest theory and argues that Lewis could have called in the officers to assist her in making a citizen’s arrest for a felony committed in her presence. We are not persuaded.
Because the officers did not obtain a warrant and the entry was nonconsensual, the motion to suppress should have been granted.
Reversed.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Gnann v. State, 662 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…a lawfully occupied motel room for the purpose of making a felony arrest absent exigent circumstances. United States v. Standridge, 810 F. 2d 1034 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072, 107 S.Ct. 2468, 95 L.Ed.2d 877 (1987); Sturdivant v. State, 578 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Finally, the state failed to present any evidence of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless arrest of Gnann or the search of the room. The officers’ deliberate decision to forego a warrant did not provide them with exig…
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Cooper v. State, 706 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…the proscription against police making a warrantless entry for purposes of search or arrest, unless they are acting under exigent circumstances or proceeding with a valid consent. See Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1994); Sturdivant v. State, 578 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Consent to enter premises occupied by a suspect may be given either by the suspect himself or by a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. See Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952 (Fla.1993), adopting the test…
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Beauchamp v. State, 742 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…of privacy in his dormitory suite. Such a room is comparable to a motel room or a room in a boarding house. See State v. Titus, 707 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1998) (concerning Fourth Amendment protection of common area of boarding house); Sturdivant v. State, 578 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (concerning Fourth Amendment protection of a motel room). The officers might have been authorized to conduct a safety sweep of the suite if they had been lawfully permitted to enter it, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Standridge, 810 F.2d 1034 (11th Cir. 1987)
- Goldberg v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 481 U.S. 1072 (U.S. 1987)
- Ratcliff v. United States, 481 U.S. 1072 (U.S. 1987)
- Wassmer v. State, 565 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- State v. Fernandez, 538 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)