EDDIE SHACKELFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1991-05-08
No. 89-03522
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
579 So. 2d 306 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1991) Caution
Cited by 22 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Eddie Shackelford pleaded no contest to drug possession and resisting arrest but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The court reversed, holding that the initial detention was invalid under Florida's stop and frisk law because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and therefore the cocaine seizure was illegal.


Holding

The court held that the initial detention was invalid because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Shackelford had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. The court further held that even if detention were valid, the search exceeded the permissible scope because there was no evidence the officers had reason to believe his closed fist contained a dangerous weapon.


Headnotes

[1] A temporary detention is authorized only when an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

[2] An officer's observation of a person leaning into the window of a car stopped in the street, who walks away upon seeing an officer, does not alone warrant a stop.

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Key Quotes

“A stop is not warranted solely upon an officer's observation of a black male in a high-crime district leaning into the window of a white man's car stopped in the middle of the street who walks away upon seeing an officer approach.”

Establishes the legal standard that mere observation of suspicious conduct in a high-crime area is insufficient to justify a stop without additional reasonable suspicion.

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Facts & Procedural History

Undercover narcotics detective Thompson observed Shackelford wave to a passing vehicle that stopped, and saw Shackelford lean toward the passenger win…

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Opinion of the Court
THREADGILL, Judge.

THREADGILL, Judge.

Eddie Shackelford pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine, a third-degree felony, and resisting arrest without violence, a first-degree misdemeanor, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse the order denying suppression and find that the cocaine was seized as a result of an illegal detention.

Clearwater Police Officer Thompson, an experienced undercover narcotics detective, noticed the appellant in an area known for street level drug sales wave to a vehicle that was slowly driving by. The car stopped, and the appellant leaned toward the passenger window and reached inside. Thompson did not see an exchange, although he had seen the appellant engaging in similar activity before. Thompson also knew the appellant from occasions when Thompson purchased drugs undercover from another defendant. The appellant was present during these transactions, but, as Thompson admitted on cross-examination, the appellant did not participate in the transactions.

Three uniformed officers in a marked patrol car responded to Thompson’s call identifying the appellant as a suspected drug dealer. They tried to head the appellant off as he was driving his bicycle, but the appellant eluded them by weaving back and forth. When Officer Quinlan ordered him to stop, the appellant kept going. The three officers chased him on foot finally catching him. Prying open his hand, they found a baggie containing a trace of cocaine.

Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (1987), authorizes a temporary detention when an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. A stop is not warranted solely upon an officer’s observation of a black male in a high-crime district leaning into the window of a white man’s car stopped in the middle of the street who walks away upon seeing an officer approach. Winters v. State, 578 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Nor is a stop warranted where the defendant engages in such activity while in the presence of known drug dealers. See Hill v. State, 561 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Martin v. State, 521 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Mosely v. State, 519 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Thus, the fact that the appellant had merely been present at other drug transactions does not raise the basis for the officers’ suspicion to the level required for detention under the stop and frisk law.

Given that the appellant’s initial detention was invalid, evidence flowing from it was tainted. See Ottney v. State, 571 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Even if the initial detention were valid, however, the seizure of the cocaine exceeded the permissible scope of a search under section 901.-151(5), Florida Statutes (1987). Under this subsection a police officer is authorized to search only to the extent necessary to disclose a weapon where there is reasonable suspicion that the detainee is armed with a dangerous weapon. See State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981). There was no evidence to show that police had reason to believe that the appellant’s closed fist contained a dangerous weapon. We therefore find that the search and seizure of the cocaine was illegal and should be suppressed.

Our determination that the appellant’s detention was illegal also disposes of the conviction for resisting arrest without violence. Flight accompanied by knowledge of an officer’s intent to detain does not constitute obstruction of justice absent an officer’s well-founded suspicion to detain the defendant. F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

Reversed and remanded.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • State v. Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …known drug area, leaning into a parked ear with unidentified object in his hand and his flight when the officer approached did not provide the officer with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity needed to justify a stop); Shackelford v. State, 579 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (officer’s observation of the defendant leaning into a window of a car in an area known for drug sales did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); Huntley v. State, 575 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (officer who…
  • Johnson v. State, 610 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …ith him. Although Bates knew Appellant had a prior drug problem, under these circumstances that fact did not raise a mere hunch to the level of founded suspicion. See Smith v. State, 592 So. 2d 1206, 1207-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Shackelford v. State, 579 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Mosley v. State, 519 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (reversing denial of suppression order where appellant clenched fists in nonthreatening manner and was accompanying purported drug dealer in high-crime area). Finally, simply hav…
  • Smith v. State, 592 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
    …. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); R.B. Furthermore, the officers’ knowledge of the appellant’s prior activities, none of which resulted in arrests, did not raise the officers’ suspicion to the level required for a lawful detention. Shackelford v. State, 579 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); In the Interest of T.M.M., 560 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). See also Robinson v. State, 388 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The fact that one of the officers testified that they were going to search the appellant for weapons…

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