MIRIAM DONNER, APPELLANT,
v.
APPALACHIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, A RHODE ISLAND CORPORATION; CITY OF MIAMI; VERNON HETHERINGTON; FOWLER, WHITE, BURNETT, HURLEY, BANICK & KNIGHT, P.A., A/K/A FOWLER, WHITE, BURNETT, HURLEY, BANICK & STRICKROOT, P.A., A FLORIDA PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION; PHILLIP W. KNIGHT, AND MICHAEL J. MURPHY, APPELLEES
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Miriam Donner appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging fraudulent misrepresentations made during discovery in a 1976 civil action. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are protected by absolute privilege and therefore cannot form the basis for a fraud claim.
The court held that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings enjoy absolute privilege and therefore Ms. Donner's complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. The dismissal with prejudice was proper.
[1] Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding enjoy absolute privilege.
[2] There must be a definite end to litigation to ensure public welfare and prevent interminable legal disputes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“statements made in course of judicial proceeding enjoy absolute privilege”
Establishes the legal principle that protects statements made during judicial proceedings from liability, which was the basis for affirming dismissal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMs. Donner filed an original action in 1976 seeking damages for injuries from her arrest and incarceration. After years of litigation problems, she fi…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
Miriam Donner appeals from an order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
This appeal is the latest in a fifteen-year-old litigation morass. Ms. Donner’s original action was filed in 1976 and sought damages for injuries arising from her arrest and the circumstances of her incarceration. Following a series of false starts, frustrated discovery forays, and appeals,1 the 1976 action languishes below awaiting retrial. In 1981, Ms. Donner sued the City of Miami and various attorneys, seeking access to the litigation files from the suit filed in 1976. Eventually, this court ordered those files produced.2 In 1989, Ms. Donner sued the parties and attorneys involved in the previous lawsuits for multiple causes of action arising from alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made during discovery in the 1976 action, which only came to light following production of the litigation files. The trial court dismissed that complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim; Ms. Donner appeals.
We agree with the trial court that the complaint Ms. Donner filed in this action failed to state a cognizable claim. See Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA), (statements made in course of judicial proceeding enjoy absolute privilege); rev. denied, 554 So. 2d 1170 (Fla.1989); Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Perl v. Omni Int’l of Miami, Ltd., 439 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (same). We therefore affirm the dismissal.3
We assign no fault to either party for the length of this litigation. However, “[i]t has been well said that there must be some point in every court proceeding when the cause is finally disposed of, its thread cut, and the parties out of court_ The public welfare demands that there shall be some definite end to litigation — a point sometime, somewhere, when every case is terminated. We cannot afford to return to the interminable and outrageous practice similar to that depicted in Dickens’ case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce.” Mabson v. Christ, 96 Fla. 756, 759, 119 So. 131, 132 (1928). We trust that trial of this cause will occur before this litigation assumes such Dickensian proportions.
Affirmed.
. See Donner v. Hetherington, 399 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Donner v. Hetherington, 376 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Donner v. Hetherington, 370 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
. See Edelstein v. Donner, 450 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), approved, 471 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1985); Donner v. Edelstein, 425 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Donner v. Edelstein, 423 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Donner v. Edelstein, 415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
.Our affirmance should not be read to bar Ms. Donner from seeking to amend her complaint pending in the circuit court or from asking the trial court to impose sanctions against the defendants for their alleged misconduct in the discovery proceedings.
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Latam Invs., LLC v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 88 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…ors Corp., 975 So. 2d 503, 505 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“Although immunity is an affirmative defense, it can be considered on a motion to dismiss if the complaint demonstrates the existence of the defense.”); see also Donner v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 580 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint on the basis of the litigation privilege); Vaswani v. Ganobselc, 402 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (“If the face of the complaint contains allegations which demonstrate the existence of an…
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Hetherington v. Donner, 786 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ee Tutor Time, 763 So. 2d at 505; see also Warner v. Warner, 692 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Ten years ago this court speaking through Judge Jorgenson warned that it was time for the case to get to trial. See Donner v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 580 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (“The public welfare demands that there shall be some definite end to litigation — a point sometime, somewhere, when every case is terminated.”) Obviously, such a general admonishment was insufficient. We order that the case…
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Breakstone v. David Lehr, M.D., 649 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…e resolution”).1 AFFIRMED. . This litigation has been pending since 1984. "There must be some point in every court proceeding when the cause is finally disposed of, its thread cut, and the parties out of court.” Donner v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 580 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 3d DCA) (citation omitted), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 181 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1669, 118 L.Ed.2d 389 (1992). We trust that the parties recognize that such a time has come.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Mabson v. Christ, 96 Fla. 756 (Fla. 1928)
- Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Donner v. Ebelstein, 415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Perl v. Omni Int'l OF Miami, Ltd., 439 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Donner v. Hetherington, 399 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Donner v. Hetherington, 370 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Edelstein v. Donner, 450 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Grabel v. Grabel, 425 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Fernandez v. State, 423 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)