CURTIS GREG BRADLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bradley appealed his conviction for two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior on a child, challenging the trial court's denial of his discharge motion, extension of the speedy trial period, delegation of restitution authority to Probation and Parole, and imposition of court costs without notice. The court affirmed the conviction and most procedural rulings but found merit in Bradley's challenge to the restitution delegation and remanded for resentencing.
The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on the speedy trial extension and court costs imposition, finding no abuse of discretion. However, the court found merit in Bradley's challenge to the delegation of restitution authority to Probation and Parole, which was improper, and set aside the sentence for resentencing.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in extending the speedy trial period when the state demonstrates diligence in locating necessary witnesses and the defense doe…
[2] A trial court's imposition of court costs complies with procedural requirements if it follows the established procedure for such impositions.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The state, however, did not rely on its inability to find the appellant, rather it represented that it had only recently been able to locate the victim and her child. Obtaining blood samples from the appellant would have been a useless effort without also being able to obtain blood samples from the child.”
Establishes why the trial court properly extended the speedy trial period—the state's diligence in locating the victim and child was not challenged, making the blood test delay justified.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBradley was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior on a child under 16. The state sought to extend the speedy trial period to obtain …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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WOLF, Judge.
Bradley challenges his conviction and sentence for two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior on a child under 16. He asserts on appeal (1) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for discharge and in granting the state’s motion to extend the speedy trial period; (2) the trial court erred in impermissibly delegating to Probation and Parole the authority to determine the appropriate amount of restitution; and (3) that the trial court erred in imposing court costs without adequate pri-or notice to appellant.
We affirm as to issues I and III, but find merit in appellant’s position as to issue II.
The defendant alleges that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion to extend the speedy trial period. The state’s motion was based upon the inability to obtain results from blood tests which would indicate whether appellant was the father of the child born to the victim. The defense in the trial court argued that the state did not use diligence in timely obtaining blood from the defendant since he was in state custody and available during the entire speedy trial period. The state, however, did not rely on its inability to find the appellant, rather it represented that it had only recently been able to locate the victim and her child. Obtaining blood samples from the appellant would have been a useless effort without also being able to obtain blood samples from the child. The defense never questioned the state’s diligence in locating the victim and her child. We decline to address the sufficiency of the state’s efforts in this regard for the first time on appeal and find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the state’s motion to extend the speedy trial pursuant to rule 3.191(d)(2), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Talton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 462 (Fla.1979).
As to the cost issue, the procedure utilized by the trial court in imposing costs complied with the procedural requirements of State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1991). Thus, this issue must be affirmed.
The state concedes that it was improper for the trial judge to delegate to Probation and Parole the responsibility to determine the appropriate amount of restitution. Huffman v. State, 472 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1986). The appellant must be re-sentenced.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed, but the sentence is set aside and the case is remanded for resentencing.
SMITH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Huffman v. State, 472 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Talton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)