J. H. TALTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court's oral order extending the speedy trial period, later reduced to writing nunc pro tunc, was timely entered before the speedy trial period expired.
Appellant was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child. He appealed, arguing his speedy trial demand should have …
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BASKIN, NATALIE, Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence involving two counts of knowingly committing a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under the age of fourteen years. Appellant asserts his Motion for Discharge under the speedy trial rule should have been granted and that the State’s Amended Motion to Extend Speedy Trial Period should have been denied. We affirm the trial court’s rulings.
On March 8, 1977, prior to the expiration of time permitted under Speedy Trial Demand, the court orally granted the State’s Amended Motion to Extend Speedy Trial Period on the basis of exceptional circumstances. The court entered its written order nunc pro tunc on April 27, 1977. In the absence of a valid extension, speedy trial time would have expired by midnight March 11, 1977. Addressing ourselves to the timeliness of the trial court’s order extending speedy trial time, we find that the order was entered before the speedy trial period had run. State ex rel. Smith v. Rudd, 347 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Although Appellant contends that speedy trial time must be extended pursuant to written order of the court, duly rendered, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 does not require that an order be entered in any particular form. The court’s oral ruling was reported and entered in writing at a later time. We agree with the court in State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), that the preparation, execution and filing of a formal written order reciting exceptional circumstances is the preferred course. That course was followed in this case. We are satisfied that the oral ruling was timely.
The trial court’s finding that exceptional circumstances existed was a matter within its discretion. State ex rel. Mullins v. Swigert, 345 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). No abuse of discretion has been shown.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
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Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1983)…th, 362 So. 2d 698, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); State v. Wolfe, 271 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Further, the trial court’s determination of exceptional circumstances is a matter of discretion based on the facts presented below. Taiton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 462 (Fla.1979). The only question in dispute was the foreseeability of the witness’ unavailability for trial. The trial court found that the unavailability was unforeseeable; we believe that the re…
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Dedmon v. State, 400 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…tate and that her absence was unforeseeable and not due to any lack of diligence by the State. The granting of an extension of speedy trial for exceptional circumstances is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge. See, e. g., Talton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686 (4th DCA 1978). Appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion in this case. The record reflects that the witness in question was under subpoena and in regular contact with the State Attorney but did not make her intended absence known until the nig…
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Brown v. State, 695 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…he fact that the assigned prosecutor was “medically incapacitated.” A finding that an “exceptional circumstance” justifying extension of the speedy trial period exists is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. E.g., Talton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 462 (Fla.1979). Applying that standard of review to the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it held that such an “exceptional circumstance” had…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State ex rel. William M. C. Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- The State of Fla. upon the relation of Leroy Smith v. Rudd, 347 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- State ex rel. Mary Louise Mullins v. The Honorable William T. Swigert, 345 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)