RICHARD A. MARTIN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
CANDICE B. MARTIN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this marriage dissolution appeal, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's child custody and support provisions but reversed the alimony award of $450 per month, finding it unsupported by evidence and not qualifying as legitimate rehabilitative, permanent, or equitable distribution alimony.
The court affirmed the child support and custody portions of the judgment, subject to modification upon material changes in circumstances. The court reversed the alimony award, holding it was unsupported by evidence and did not constitute legitimate rehabilitative, permanent, or equitable distribution alimony.
[1] A judgment filed after the filing of a notice of appeal is a nullity.
[2] Child support and custody orders are always subject to reevaluation upon any material change of circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“rehabilitative alimony is for a needy spouse to obtain a skill or license or education to equip her (or him) to be self-supporting”
Establishes the legal definition and requirements for rehabilitative alimony, which appellee failed to satisfy
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage of Richard A. Martin and Candice B. Martin, including provisions for child support an…
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a marriage dissolution case. Parenthetically, we note that the judge signed two judgments dated the same day, one prepared by appellant’s attorney, entitled “Final Order for Dissolution of Marriage,” the other prepared by appellee’s attorney, entitled “Final Judgment.” The judgment prepared by appellee’s attorney was filed, thus rendered, on August 9, 1990 while the judgment prepared by appellant’s attorney was filed on September 28, 1990. The September 28, 1990 judgment was filed after the filing of the notice of appeal and is thus a nullity.
We affirm the child support and custody portions of the judgment with the caveat that all such matters are always subject to reevaluation upon any material change of circumstances regarding visitation, shared parental responsibility or alternating residency. See e.g., Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Age of the children and proximity of the residences of the parents are critical factors in the decision to award alternating custody. See also Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
We reverse the alimony award which reads (in both judgments, by the way):
8. The Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($450.00) per month as alimony, said payments to commence on June 1, 1990, and continue on the first (1st) day of each month thereafter until the minor child of the parties reaches school age and is enrolled in kindergarten, at which time the alimony payments shall terminate.
This award is unsupported by the evidence. It is probably intended to be some kind of rehabilitative alimony because it is in a fixed amount for a set period of time. The record does not reveal any specific need for rehabilitative alimony. As was said in Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rehabilitative alimony is for a needy spouse to obtain a skill or license or education to equip her (or him) to be self-supporting. This appel-lee did not demonstrate either a plan for rehabilitation or a need.
Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla.1983) quotes Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980) and says “The principal purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to establish the capacity for self-support of the receiving spouse, either through the redevelopment of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop potential supportive skills.” In Campbell v. Campbell, 432 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. dismissed, 453 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.1984), this court used language that appellee has seized upon to urge this court to affirm an unproved need for specific rehabilitation, money to “weather the storm,” or as has been suggested other places, money to “bridge the gap.” There is no support in law or logic for such an award as rehabilitative alimony. If such were permitted then one can imagine no bounds to the limits — how far does one go before the storm is weathered or the gap is bridged?
Alimony is for one of three purposes: either for permanent support, rehabilitative to reach a specific goal or as a device to reach equitable distribution of marital property. This award was none of these; it is reversed.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
COBB and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.
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Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…); Parker v. Parker, 655 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). See also Abrams, I Fla. Family Law, Ch. 31.05(2)(c). . See Calderon v. Calderon, 730 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Martin v. Martin, 582 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). See also Abrams, I Fla. Family Law, Ch. 31.04(1)(b). . See Vick v. Vick, 675 So. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). . See Layeni v. Layeni, 843 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2…
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Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…denied it in the final judgment with the explanation that Larry had improperly requested “bridge the gap” rehabilitative alimony. This court has ruled that bridge-the-gap rehabilitative alimony is inappropriate as a matter of law. Martin v. Martin, 582 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). However, the pleadings and record in this cause show the former husband was also seeking rehabilitative alimony on traditional grounds: “redevelopment of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop potentia…
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Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…A 1998); Shea v. Shea, 572 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Iribar v. Iribar, 510 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).6 The Fifth District has held that “[t]here is no support in law or logic for such an award as rehabilitative alimony.” Martin v. Martin, 582 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). But see Vick v. Vick, 675 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (affirming award of “transitional” alimony when husband opposed rehabilitative alimony but represented wife may be entitled to “transitional” alimony). This court has…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983)
- Campbell v. Chalermsri V. Campbell, 432 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Vernell v. Edge, Inc., 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Budagail S. Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Gerscovich v. Eugenio Alberto Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)