LARRY J. INGLE, APPELLANT,
v.
NANCY A. INGLE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Former husband Larry Ingle appeals a divorce final judgment, claiming inadequate asset distribution and wrongful denial of rehabilitative alimony. The appellate court remands the case because the trial judge failed to make required fact-findings under Florida's equitable distribution statute and failed to analyze statutory factors for alimony, though the court upholds the denial of the judge's disqualification motion.
The trial court erred by failing to make required fact-findings under section 61.075(1) to justify the unequal asset distribution and by failing to analyze section 61.08(2) factors before denying rehabilitative alimony. The case is remanded for the trial court to make these findings and reconsider both issues.
[1] A trial court must make fact-findings to justify the distribution of marital assets, even if the distribution is unequal.
[2] A party seeking disqualification of a trial judge must meet a heavy burden when the motion is filed late in the proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The amended equitable distribution statute articulates the premise that marital assets must be evenly split (50/50) unless circumstances or factors make this outcome inequitable”
Establishes the legal presumption favoring equal asset distribution in divorce cases.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLarry and Nancy Ingle were divorcing. The trial court distributed marital assets unequally in Nancy's favor without making required fact-findings. The…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statutory Factors For Alimony cases and more on FLexlaw
[*224] W. SHARP, Judge.
The former husband, Larry Ingle, appeals from a final judgment of dissolution. He claims he was shortchanged in the distribution of the parties’ marital assets, wrongfully denied rehabilitative alimony, and that the trial judge erred in not recusing himself shortly before the final judgment was entered. We agree this cause should be remanded because the trial judge failed to make the fact-findings required by section 61.075(1).1 Further, the court also failed to make findings concerning the factors set out in section 61.08(2) in denying an award of rehabilitative alimony to the former husband.
With regard to the motion for disqualification of the trial judge, we do not think the allegations were legally sufficient to mandate the trial judge’s recusal. Therefore, the judge properly proceeded to enter the final judgment after the trial had been held and the court had made various oral rulings, prior to filing of the motion to disqualify. A delay in moving to disqualify a trial judge at such a late point in a proceeding places a heavy burden on the party moving to disqualify.
On remand, the trial judge should reference the factors listed in section 61.075, to justify the distribution of marital assets in this case. The parties here concede that the distribution was unequal, and in the former wife’s favor. Section 61.075(3) requires fact-findings to justify the distribution whether it is equal or otherwise. The amended equitable distribution statute articulates the premise that marital assets must be evenly split (50/50) unless circumstances or factors make this outcome inequitable,2 and prior law suggested that 50/50 was a good starting point. Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). In view of the law’s bias toward equal distribution of marital assets to the parties, it is particularly vital to make findings in cases such as this, where the distribution is admittedly not equal.
With regard to the former husband’s request for rehabilitative alimony, the trial judge denied it in the final judgment with the explanation that Larry had improperly requested “bridge the gap” rehabilitative alimony. This court has ruled that bridge-the-gap rehabilitative alimony is inappropriate as a matter of law. Martin v. Martin, 582 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). However, the pleadings and record in this cause show the former husband was also seeking rehabilitative alimony on traditional grounds: “redevelopment of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop potential supportive skills.” Martin, 582 So. 2d at 785, citing Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Thus, on remand, the trial court may reconsider this issue, and in making a final ruling it should reference the factors listed in section 61.08(2).
Accordingly we reverse those parts of the final decree dealing with equitable distribution of marital assets and rehabilitative alimony, and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ„ concur. . See Plyler v. Plyler, 622 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
. § 61.075(1), Fla.Stat. (1993). This revised statute was not in effect when this lawsuit was filed. Section 8 of Laws of Florida 1993, c. 93-188 specifically provides that the Act does not apply to proceedings pending on October 1, 1993 and that those proceedings remained governed by the law in effect on September 30, 1993.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…DCA 1998); Lynch v. Lynch, 695 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Parker v. Parker, 655 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). See also Abrams, I Fla. Family Law, Ch. 31.05(2)(c). . See Calderon v. Calderon, 730 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Martin v. Martin, 582 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). See also Abrams, I Fla. Family Law, Ch. 31.04(1)(b). . See Vick v. Vick, 675 So. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 199…
-
Rausch v. Rausch, 680 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…e factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award or denial of alimony.”1 The failure to comply with this statutory duty requires reversal by the appellate court and remand with instructions that proper findings be provided. Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Here, although evidence concerning the statutory factors was presented by the parties, the dissolution judgment must [*625] be reversed because no findings of fact were set forth therein. We are aware that there are ever increa…
-
Fullerton v. Fullerton, 709 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…th the former husband that the trial court erred when it awarded the former wife rehabilitative alimony of $150 per month for five years. This court has held that rehabilitative alimony cannot be awarded absent a rehabilitative plan. Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), rev. denied, 699 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1997); Berki v. Berki, 636 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 645 So. 2d 450 (Fla.1994). In this case, the former wife neither requested rehabilitative alimony nor did she present a rehabil…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Heidelburg v. State, 622 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Martin v. Martin, 582 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)