WILLIAM T. OGLESBY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1991-07-29
No. 90-2275
WIGGINTON, J„ concurs., WOLF, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.
584 So. 2d 93 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant Oglesby was convicted of armed trespass, criminal mischief, and assault after entering negotiated nolo pleas. While affirming the convictions, the Florida appellate court vacated and remanded for resentencing because the trial court imposed both incarceration and community control without written reasons for departing from sentencing guidelines.


Holding

The appellate court affirmed the convictions but vacated and remanded for resentencing. It held that the imposition of both incarceration and community control constitutes a guidelines departure requiring written reasons under State v. VanKooten, and that the negotiated sentencing recommendation is not binding on the court and does not entitle the appellant to withdraw his pleas.


Headnotes

[1] A negotiated sentencing recommendation is not binding on the court and does not require that the defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw their plea.

[2] The imposition of both incarceration and community control constitutes a departure from the sentencing guidelines when no written reasons are provided.

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Key Quotes

“when providing for community control or incarceration the guidelines establish alternative sanctions, so that the imposition of both constitutes a departure”

Establishes the core legal principle that combining both incarceration and community control requires written departure reasons

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant entered negotiated nolo pleas in exchange for a reduced charge and the state's sentencing recommendation. The sentencing guidelines scoreshe…

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Opinion of the Court
ALLEN, Judge.

ALLEN, Judge.

The appellant challenges judgments of conviction and sentences imposed for armed trespass, criminal mischief, and assault. We affirm the judgments of conviction, but we find that resentencing is necessitated by the court’s failure to provide any written reason for departing from the permitted sentencing range established under the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701 sentencing guidelines.

The appellant entered negotiated nolo pleas in exchange for a reduced charge and the state’s recommendation of a “guidelines sentence.” The court accepted the pleas and was advised of the agreed sentencing recommendation. A sentencing guidelines scoresheet was prepared with a recommended range of “community control or 12-30 mos. incarceration.” The permitted range authorized “any nonstate prison sanction or community control or 1-3½ years incarceration.” The court adjudicated appellant guilty on all counts, and imposed a sentence of 11 months 29 days incarceration, followed by 2 years community control, for the armed trespass. Concurrent 60-day terms of incarceration were imposed for the criminal mischief and assault.

The appellant argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas because the court did not comply with the negotiated sentencing recommendation. But the appellant did not condition his pleas upon a specific sentence, and the negotiated recommendation is not binding on the court and does not require that the appellant be given an opportunity to withdraw his pleas. See State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1977); Thomas v. State, 566 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), jurisdiction accepted, 577 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 1991).

The appellant also contends that a departure sentence was improperly imposed without any written reasons to support the departure. As indicated in State v. VanKooten, 522 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1988), when providing for community control or incarceration the guidelines establish alternative sanctions, so that the imposition of both constitutes a departure. It does not matter that the incarcerative term is for less than a year and would be served in the county jail. See Belcher v. State, 559 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). And while cases such as Tillman v. State, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), have determined that it is not a departure to require jail time as a condition of community control, the court did not make the term of incarceration a condition of community control in the present case. Rather, the court imposed these alternatives as sequential sanctions, without providing any written reason for departure, contrary to the supreme court’s unqualified pronouncement in Van-Kooten.

In Ewing v. State, 526 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), a divided panel of this court declined to apply VanKooten to a combined sentence of incarceration and community control where the total term did not exceed the maximum period of incarceration recommended under the guidelines. Distinguishing VanKooten on this basis, the Ewing majority relied on a committee note to rule 3.701 which approves community control as a “viable alternative” for a “state prison sentence.” The present case is similar to Ewing in that the total term of incarceration and community control does not exceed the maximum period of incarceration in the permitted guidelines range. But the present case is unlike Ewing in that it does not involve a state prison sentence. Instead, the appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration which would be served in the county jail, and the committee notes to rule 3.701 expressly state that community control is not an alternative for a “nonstate prison sanction.” This case thus remains directly controlled by VanKooten, and while this may produce an anomaly in that Ewing allows the greater sanction of a state prison sentence to be imposed with a term of community control, we are not now compelled to reexamine Ewing. As the state concedes, VanKooten establishes that the court should not have sentenced the appellant to both a term of incarceration and community control without providing a written reason for this guidelines departure.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed. The sentences are vacated, and the cause is remanded for resentencing.

WIGGINTON, J„ concurs.

WOLF, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.

Other
WOLF, Judge,

WOLF, Judge,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

Pursuant to sentencing guidelines, appellant could have received a sentence within the permitted range of “any nonstate prison sanction or community control or 1-3 ½ years incarceration.” I do not believe that the sentence imposed by the trial court (11 months, 29 days’ incarceration, followed by two years’ community control) constituted a departure sentence.

In State v. VanKooten, 522 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1988); State v. Bodine, 522 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1988); Hankey v. State, 505 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla.1987), (approved by the supreme court in VanKooten)] and Belcher v. State, 559 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), the combined length of the period of incarceration and community control exceeded the maximum period of incarceration which was permitted under sentencing guidelines. In the instant case, the combined total of the incarceration and community control imposed was shorter than the maximum period of incarceration permitted under the guidelines. I, therefore, do not believe that the cited cases are controlling.

It is undisputed that the court could have imposed a legal guidelines sentence of 1) three and a half years’ incarceration; 2) any combination of community control and state prison incarceration which did not exceed three and a half years (Ewing v. State, 526 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)); or 3) 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration as a condition of community control, Tillman v. State, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Each of these sentences are more severe than the one actually imposed. Common sense dictates that the sentence imposed in the instant case did not constitute a departure. I would affirm as to both issues.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Davis v. State, 617 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …d of incarceration permitted under the guidelines. The court reasoned that a departure sentence does not result where the combined sanctions do not exceed the maximum guidelines incarcerative period. A contra result was reached in Oglesby v. State, 584 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which, like the instant case, involved combined sanctions of county jail incarceration and community control. In Oglesby, this court held that a combined sanction of community control and incarceration in county jail constitutes…
    1 / 2
  • Karee L. Sapp v. State, 592 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …lists an additional offense at conviction for which there is no record support. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing after correction of the scoresheet. We note also that the sentence imposed by the trial court is improper under Oglesby v. State, 584 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The conviction is AFFIRMED, but the sentence is VACATED and the cause is REMANDED for resentencing. SMITH, ZEHMER and ALLEN, JJ., concur.…
  • Peoples v. State, 635 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …to 3½ years in prison. The recommended sentence was community control or 12 to 30 months’ incarceration. Peoples argues on appeal that her sentence is illegal on the authority of State v. VanKooten, 522 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1988), and Oglesby v. State, 584 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We agree that the resolution of this case is controlled by VanKooten and our decision in Oglesby, and therefore we vacate her sentences and remand the cause for re-sentencing. See also, Davis v. State, 617 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st…

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