PATRICK HAYES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reviews conditions of probation imposed on a robbery conviction, striking a requirement to pay work program costs that was not orally pronounced at sentencing, but upholding a drug testing condition authorized by statute that did not require oral pronouncement.
The requirement to pay work program costs must be stricken because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing. However, the requirement to submit to random drug, breath, and urinalysis testing is valid because it is authorized by section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and statutory authorization satisfies due process notice requirements, so oral pronouncement is not required for this standard condition of probation.
[1] A special condition of probation that is not orally pronounced at sentencing must be stricken from the written order.
[2] A condition of probation authorized by statute, such as random drug testing, may satisfy due process notice requirements through constructive notice provided by the statu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because this special condition of probation was not orally pronounced, it must be stricken from the written order.”
Establishes the rule that special probation conditions must be orally pronounced at sentencing to be valid.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatrick Hayes was convicted of robbery and sentenced to probation with various conditions. At sentencing, the judge orally pronounced that the appella…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges certain conditions of probation which were imposed upon his conviction for the offense of robbery. The requirement that the appellant pay costs associated with his participation in a work program was not orally pronounced at the time of sentencing. Although the judge indicated at sentencing that the appellant would have to pay a specified sum for “court costs,” this assessment did not encompass a work program payment. Because this special condition of probation was not orally pronounced, it must be stricken from the written order. See Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
However, we find that the further requirement that the appellant submit to blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations did not’need to be orally pronounced, because it is authorized by section 948.03(l)(j), Florida Statutes.
In State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991), the supreme court indicated that the notice requirements of procedural due process may be satisfied through the constructive notice afforded by the provisions of the Florida Statutes. Beasley involved an assessment of costs mandated by statute, but the principle applied in that case should also apply in the present case which involves a condition of probation allowed by statute. As in Beasley, the appellant in this case had adequate notice as to the possible consequences of his actions, and was provided an opportunity to be heard and to raise any objections at the sentencing hearing.
Because the requirement that the appellant submit to blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations accords with the provision of section 948.03(l)(j) for “random testing,” it is a standard condition of probation, and under the rationale of Beasley it does not need to be orally pronounced. This standard condition may be imposed regardless of whether it is directly related to the circumstances of the appellant’s offense, because it is one of the conditions which is made applicable to any probationer under section 948.03. See Ward v. State, 511 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Although some standard conditions may still depend on the circumstances of the offense (e.g., see section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes, providing for restitution “for the damage or loss caused”), section 948.03(l)(j) is not limited in this manner. Even though random drug testing is authorized by section 948.03(1)(j), in Seawright v. State, 572 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), it was described as a special condition of probation which, needs to be orally pronounced.
However, the opinion in Sea-wright does not refer to section 948.03(l)(j), and does not indicate whether this provision, which was adopted by chapter 88-122, section 71, Laws of Florida, was applicable to the proceedings in that case.
The requirement that the appellant pay costs associated with his participation in a work program is stricken from the probation order. As so amended, the order is affirmed.
WIGGINTON and WOLF, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Tillman v. State, 592 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…y case. This statute has been held to provide constructive notice of the condition which together with the opportunity to be heard and raise any objections at a sentencing hearing satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Thus, we find that the condition of random drug testing is properly contained within the written order. We therefore reverse the written order of probation and remand for deletion of all of the challenged conditions except the s…
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Cumbie v. State, 597 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…bation (i.e., those listed in Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes) may be included in the written order even if they are not pronounced orally at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Tillman v. State, 592 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). With the exception of the words “at your own expense” (which we conclude amount to a special condition of probation), Condition (12) of the written probation order is consistent with the standard condition of probation set forth…
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Vasquez v. State, 663 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…uctive notice of their subject matter and that such notice, together with the opportunity to be heard and raise any objections at a sentencing hearing, is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. See Tillman; Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 593 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.1991). See also State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1991). This exception has been narrowly construed, thus making most conditions subject to the requirement of oral pronouncement. We note that…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Ward v. State, 511 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Seawright v. State, 572 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)