WILLIE WARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Ward appealed his probation sentence that included a condition requiring him to pay child support arrearages of $3,000. The court held that while trial courts may impose child support payment conditions under Florida law, the trial court erred by failing to determine whether Ward had the ability to pay before imposing this financial obligation.
Trial courts are authorized to impose child support payment conditions on probationers under Florida Statutes § 948.03(1)(f), which requires probationers to support their legal dependents to the best of their ability, regardless of the crime charged. However, the court must first determine the defendant's present ability to pay both current and past-due child support before imposing such a financial obligation.
[1] A trial court may impose a condition of probation requiring a defendant to support his legal dependents, regardless of whether that condition is related to the offense fo…
[2] A trial court must determine a defendant's ability to pay before imposing a financial obligation, such as child support or restitution, as a condition of probation.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute implies that there need be no relationship between these enumerated conditions and the particular crime for which the probationer stands convicted”
Establishes that probation conditions need not be related to the offense charged
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWard was charged with aggravated battery by use of a deadly weapon on his estranged wife. He pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced to six months' …
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ERVIN, Judge.
The appellant appeals his final judgment and sentence, contending that the trial court erred in imposing, as a condition of probation, the requirement that the appellant pay child support per civil order. We hold that the trial court was justified in imposing such a condition, but that it erred in failing to make a determination of the appellant’s ability to pay the ordered support.
The appellant was charged with aggravated battery by use of a deadly weapon on his estranged wife. He pled nolo contendere to the charge and was sentenced to six months’ incarceration, followed by three years’ probation. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court, upon ascertaining that the appellant was $3,000 behind on his child support payments, added as a condition of probation the requirement that he “[p]ay child support as per Civil Order.”
The appellant argues that the condition requiring payment of child support is not reasonably related to the offense charged, and, therefore, is an invalid condition of probation. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, however, expressly authorizes the sentencing court to impose nine conditions of probation in every case. In Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.1982), the Fifth District held that the statute implies that there need be no relationship between these enumerated conditions and the particular crime for which the probationer stands convicted. One of the enumerated conditions, stated in section 948.03(l)(f), requires the probationer to “[sjupport his legal dependents to the best of his ability.” The trial court’s order, requiring the appellant to pay child support, is essentially synonymous with the obligation to support one’s dependents. Because such a requirement can be imposed on any probationer under section 948.03, regardless of the crime charged, it is unnecessary that the condition of payment of child support be reasonably related to the appellant’s conviction of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
We find that the trial court did err, however, in imposing a financial burden upon the appellant as a condition of probation without first making a determination of the appellant’s present ability to pay his current child support in the amount of $3,000, as well as unpaid arrearages. See Goodling v. State, 482 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (determination of defendant’s ability to pay restitution is nondelegable judicial responsibility); Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (before payment schedule is adopted by court, defendant must be afforded the opportunity to be heard on his ability to comply therewith); Jones v. State, 360 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (in order to enforce order requiring payment of costs, court must find that defendant’s financial condition is such that payment can be made). The order is therefore reversed for a determination by the trial court of whether the appellant has the present ability to pay both current and past due child support.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SMITH, C.J., and BOOTH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…standard condition may be imposed regardless of whether it is directly related to the circumstances of the appellant’s offense, because it is one of the conditions which is made applicable to any probationer under section 948.03. See Ward v. State, 511 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although some standard conditions may still depend on the circumstances of the offense (e.g., see section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes, providing for restitution “for the damage or loss caused”), section 948.03(l)(j) is not li…
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Fernandez v. State, 677 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…standard condition may be imposed regardless of whether it is directly related to the circumstances of the appellant’s offense, because it is one of the conditions which is made applicable to any probationer under section 948.03. See Ward v. State, 511 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although some standard conditions may still depend on the circumstances of the offense (e.g., see section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes, providing for restitution “for the damage or loss caused”), section 948.03(1)© is not limi…
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Brock v. State, 667 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…a standard condition of probation that can be imposed on all defendants under section 948.03, we concluded in Hayes that it can be imposed irrespective of whether it directly relates to the circumstances of a defendant’s offense. Id.; Ward v. State, 511 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). We find Hayes to be controlling. The appellant urges us instead to reverse on the authority of Nunez, 633 So. 2d at 1146, in which the condition required the defendant to submit to tests to determine the use of alcohol or contr…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Frank v. State, 360 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Goodling v. State, 482 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)