STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID RUSSELL TOWNSEND, III, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of charges against Townsend for resisting arrest without violence under Fla. Stat. § 843.03. The court held that providing false identification during a lawful traffic investigation constitutes the offense even if the defendant later recants and provides true information after arrest, rejecting the policy rationale that once-excused false statements to encourage truthfulness no longer apply post-arrest.
Yes. The court held that providing false identification during a lawful investigation constitutes the offense under Fla. Stat. § 843.03, regardless of whether the defendant later provides correct information after arrest. The policy reason for excusing false statements to encourage truthfulness no longer applies once an arrest has occurred.
[1] An offense under Florida Statute 843.03 occurs when a defendant gives a police officer a false name during a lawful investigation, is arrested under the statute, and then…
[2] The policy of inducing witnesses to tell the truth by excusing false statements is no longer applicable after an arrest has occurred.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with In Interest of J.H., 559 So.2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) that the policy reason for excusing false testimony in order to induce witnesses to change their statement and tell the truth as enunciated in P.P. v. State, 466 So.2d 1140 (Fla.3d DCA 1985) is no longer applicable after an arrest has occurred.”
Establishes the key legal principle that post-arrest recantations do not benefit from the policy excusing false statements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputy Collins observed a vehicle speeding and pursued it into a parking lot where he found Townsend and another individual. When asked for identifica…
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HARRIS, Judge.
On May 15, 1990 Deputy Collins saw a vehicle speed past him on Pine Hill Road in Orange County. He pursued the vehicle and observed it turn into a parking lot. When he entered the parking lot, Deputy Collins saw David Russell Townsend and another individual standing outside the automobile.
Deputy Collins asked Townsend for identification; Townsend stated that he had none. When Deputy Collins asked Townsend why he was driving without a license, Townsend denied that he was driving claiming instead that Gary Poellien, who was also standing near the car, was the driver. Upon further questioning, Townsend gave his name as Sean Michael Downey and his address as 6210 Seybold. While Deputy Collins spoke with Townsend, Deputy Callahan spoke with Mr. Poellien who stated that the car belonged to Townsend and that Townsend was driving.
While Deputy Collins ran a computer check, appellee admitted to Deputy Callahan that he had given a false address. The computer check revealed that the vehicle was registered to David Townsend. Upon being advised of this, Townsend admitted that the car was his, but again claimed that his name was Downey. Only after arrest and further questioning did appellee reveal his true name.
The State charged Townsend with resisting arrest without violence by obstructing an officer attempting to issue a traffic citation or investigate a traffic infraction. Townsend moved to dismiss the information on the ground that he recanted the false information before booking. The trial court dismissed the charge but certified the following question to this court: Has an offense under Florida Statute 843.03 occurred when, during a lawful investigation, a defendant gives a police officer a false name, is then arrested under Florida Statute 843.03, and after being placed under arrest, prior to booking, gives his correct name?
We answer the question in the affirmative and reverse.
We agree with In Interest of J.H., 559 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) that the policy reason for excusing false testimony in order to induce witnesses to change their statement and tell the truth as enunciated in P.P. v. State, 466 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.3d DCA 1985) is no longer applicable after an arrest has occurred.
Townsend, by his constant lying, made the investigation of a simple misdemeanor driving without a license charge far more time consuming than it normally would be. His post-arrest admission of his identity, after it was discovered by the officer through other means, was mere confirmation after the investigation was, for all practical purposes, complete.
This decision is consistent with Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
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Dewayne Fripp v. State, 766 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…over for a traffic infraction; this court found it significant that the defendant “was already under arrest for the theft of the motor scooter before confessing to his true identity.” Id. at 703. As the fifth district observed in State v. Townsend, 585 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), “the policy reason for excusing false testimony in order to induce witnesses to change their statement and tell the truth ... is no longer applicable after an arrest has occurred.” (Citation omitted). AFFIRMED. STEVENSON…
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L.J. v. State, 971 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…rious harm had already occurred. Not only is A.A.R. distinguishable, and therefore, inapplicable, but the facts presented in this case are similar to the factual scenario in Fripp v. State, 766 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and State v. Townsend, 585 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), in which the appellate courts found that once the defendants were arrested, the policy reasons behind excusing the providing of false information were no longer applicable. Fripp, 766 So. 2d at 254 (holding that policy reason fo…
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Atkins v. State, 959 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…charge of resisting an officer without violence1 should have been granted in accordance with the holding of A.A.R. v. State, 926 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). See also Steele v. State, 537 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Compare State v. Townsend, 585 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We note that this matter was not raised before the trial court except by an unparticularized motion for judgment of acquittal. The error, however, was fundamental because it affirmatively appears from the case put on by the Stat…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- P.P. v. State, 466 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Woods v. Ashlin, 544 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- In the Interest of J.H., 559 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)