ROOSEVELT DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a trial court's initial decision not to impose a habitual offender sentence, after considering the evidence and argument, constitutes an acquittal of that sentence for double jeopardy purposes.
[1] A trial court's initial decision not to impose a habitual offender sentence, after considering the evidence and hearing argument, constitutes an acquittal of a habitual o…
[2] A trial court cannot, on its own motion, impose a habitual offender sentence after having previously declined to do so, even if the original sentence imposed was illegal.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court initially sentenced the defendant within the guidelines and declined to find him a habitual offender. Later, the court reconvened, dec…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Acquittal cases and more on FLexlaw
ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant, Roosevelt Davis, appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and his sentence as a habitual offender. Although we affirm the conviction without comment, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.
On February 2, 1990, the trial court sentenced appellant to twenty-two years in prison, which the judge believed was the upper limit of the permitted guidelines range. The state urged the court to find that Davis was a habitual felony offender and to impose an enhanced sentence, but the court declined.
On February 27, 1990, on its own motion, the court reconvened the parties and stated that appellant’s sentence was illegal, because the maximum sentence for his second-degree felony was fifteen years. The court then declared Davis to be a habitual offender and sentenced him to twenty-two years as a habitual offender. This was error.
The trial court’s initial decision not to find Davis a habitual offender, after considering the evidence and hearing argument on that issue, constituted an acquittal of a habitual offender sentence. See Brown v. State, 521 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 270, 102 L.Ed.2d 258 (1988); Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 291 (Fla.1991).
In Brown, the supreme court concluded that when a trial court has commenced a capital sentencing proceeding and determines therein that the death penalty is inapplicable to the defendant, that operates as an acquittal of the death sentence for double jeopardy purposes, even if the decision was erroneous. In Donald, we concluded that a trial judge who had expressed the view at the original sentencing hearing that a life sentence under the habitual offender statute was inappropriate could not thereafter impose a habitual offender sentence on the court’s motion, even after realizing that the original sentence was illegal.
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.
ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1994)…review Hams v. State, 624 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), in which the district court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause [*387] did not bar the imposition of a habitual offender sentence. We have jurisdiction based on conflict with Davis v. State, 587 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we approve Harris. Harris was convicted of robbery while armed with a firearm and resisting an officer without violence. Although the State requested habitual offender s…1 / 2
-
Ural Grimes, Jr. v. State, 616 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ve treated Grimes as an habitual offender at the time of the original sentencing. Because of the undecided state of the law at that time, the judge decided not to do so, and instead gave eight concurrent guidelines life sentences. In Davis v. State, 587 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), this court reversed an habitual offender sentence which the trial court had imposed on its own motion after initially imposing what the judge believed was a permitted guidelines sentence. On appeal, this court held that the tria…
-
Davis v. State, 627 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…of appellant’s motion for a new trial that he, rather than appellant, possessed the weapons in question and threw them out of the window of the vehicle prior to appellant’s arrest for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Davis v. State, 587 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). To establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant was required to show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; (2) a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different abse…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Vermon T. Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Madsen v. State, 521 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1988)
- Hurtado v. United States, 488 U.S. 912 (U.S. 1988)
- Florida v. Belcher, 488 U.S. 912 (U.S. 1988)