J.S., A JUVENILE, AND B.S.B., A JUVENILE, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-05-07
Nos. 89-382, 89-383
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.
588 So. 2d 593 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Two juveniles appealed their delinquency findings for dealing in stolen property (a boat). The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction and restitution order, holding that the trial court properly allowed the state to question a witness based on a written statement and that restitution for damage caused by the buyer's concealment efforts was properly ordered.


Holding

The trial court did not commit reversible error in either regard. First, although the state's questioning from the statement may have been questionable under the applicable statute, the respondents waived any objection by cross-examining a police officer using the same statement and failing to object when it was admitted into evidence. Second, restitution for the damage was proper because the damage bore a significant relationship to the offense of dealing in stolen property.


Headnotes

[1] A party waives objection to the use of a witness's prior written statement for questioning if the party cross-examines another witness from the same statement and does no…

[2] When a prior written statement is properly in evidence, a party may question a witness based on that statement.

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Key Quotes

“the respondents, in any event, waived any objection to such questioning by cross-examining a prior witness [the investigating police officer] from the same statement (R. 40-45) and by offering no objection when the statement was received in evidence by the trial court upon the state's offer (R. 46)”

Establishes the waiver of the evidentiary objection based on prior use and failure to object

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Facts & Procedural History

J.S. and B.S.B., juveniles, were charged with dealing in stolen property. They sold a stolen boat to Joseph L. Cassaw, who damaged the boat by draggin…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the respondents J.S. and B.S.B. from adverse findings of delinquency for the offense of dealing in stolen property, to wit: a boat, and an order of disposition entered after a non-jury trial. We affirm.

First, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error, as urged, in allowing the state to question its witness Keith Hill based on a written statement which was given by the witness to the police. Although arguably under the then-effective statute,1 the state could not, as a general rule, conduct such questioning from the subject statement because the witness had not allegedly given testimony affirmatively prejudicial to the state,2 [a conclusion as to which we have some doubt], the respondents, in any event, waived any objection to such questioning by cross-examining a prior witness [the investigating police officer] from the same statement (R. 40-45) and by offering no objection when the statement was received in evidence by the trial court upon the state’s offer (R. 46).

The statement was therefore properly in evidence before the trial court when Keith Hill was called as a witness, and, under these circumstances, we conclude that it was permissible for the state to ask Hill questions based on this statement.

C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.2, at 299 (2d ed. 1984). Compare In Interest of F.R., 539 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (where juvenile objected to challenged evidence both during the examination of the police officer and during the attempted impeachment of the juvenile) with Lowman v. State, 353 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and Kiraly v. State, 212 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 3d DCA) (where defense counsel failed to object to the challenged evidence and later referred to it during his own questioning of witnesses), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 747 (Fla.1968).

Second, the trial court properly ordered the respondents to make restitution to the owner of the stolen boat in the amount of $943.00.

The evidence below established that the respondents sold the stolen boat to Joseph L. Cassaw who, in turn, damaged the boat by dragging it from a canal across land into a shed in an effort to conceal same.

We conclude that the damage to the boat, the amount of which is uncontested, bore a significant relationship to the offense of dealing in stolen property; it can reasonably be expected that when one sells stolen property to another, as here, the latter may very well take drastic measures to conceal same and in the process damage the property. State v. Williams, 520 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1988); J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737 (Fla.1985); § 39.11(l)(f), Fla.Stat. (1987).

Affirmed.

. § 90.608, Fla.Stat. (1987) (since modified Ch. 90-174, § 1, Laws of Fla.).

. See, e.g., Brumbley v. State, 453 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla.1984); Hernandez v. State, 156 Fla. 356, 22 So. 2d 781 (1945); Parnell v. State, 500 So. 2d 558, 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 509 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1987); Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380, 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1987).


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Citator

Cited By

  • J.S. v. State, 717 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …997). One aspect of such a “significant relationship” is whether there is a causal relationship between the criminal conduct and the loss claimed by the victim. See J.O.S. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1997); J.K., 695 So. 2d at 869; J.S. v. State, 588 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). For example, in J.M. v. State, 661 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the defendant pled guilty to burglary of a conveyance and grand theft auto. A week before the theft, the victim had lost a ring with his house and car keys. The…
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  • Amin Dahlawi v. Zahid Ramlawi, 644 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …l accounting of the partnership affairs, and an action at law may generally not be maintained. Section 620.665, Florida Statutes (1993); Manning v. Clark, 56 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1951); Wills v. Andrews, 73 Fla. 384, 75 So. 618 (1917); Ponton v. Bradley, 588 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); RBC I, Inc. v. AJAR I, Inc., 519 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). We agree with the trial court that, if Ramlawi proves a partnership was established, his remedy is to seek an accounting, not an award for damages. Ramlawi’s disguis…
  • Boyce v. M.F. Hort, 666 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …n equity because the appropriate remedy for partnership disputes is a formal accounting of the partnership. § 620.665, Fla.Stat. (1981); Manning v. Clark, 56 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1951); Wills v. Andrews, 73 Fla. 384, 75 So. 618 (1917); Ponton v. Bradley, 588 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); RBC I, Inc. v. AJAR I, Inc., 519 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Here, since the parties’ pleadings seek equi [*974] table relief in the form of a partnership accounting, this matter must proceed in equity. Importantly, the mere…

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