CHARLES LOWMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Charles Lowman was convicted of robbery and firearm display during a robbery. He appealed arguing that the trial court erred by allowing testimony about additional missing property not charged in the information, and that his convictions and sentences were improper. The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences.
The court affirmed all convictions and sentences. First, the defendant waived any objection to the testimony by failing to timely object and by instead cross-examining witnesses on the missing property for impeachment value. Second, even if error occurred, the actual jury instructions adequately covered the substance of the requested charge. Third, because the offenses violated separate statutes, the fact that they arose from the same criminal episode did not make the sentence improper.
[1] A defendant's failure to object to the elicitation of testimony and subsequent exploitation of that testimony for impeachment purposes can vitiate an argument that the te…
[2] Refusal to give a requested jury instruction is not error if the substance of the requested charge is covered by instructions that were given.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This combination of failure to raise timely objections and exploitation for impeachment value is sufficient of itself to vitiate defendant's argument.”
Establishes that defendant waived objections by failing to timely object and by using the evidence for cross-examination purposes
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLowman, while leaving his girlfriend's home, entered the living room where the girlfriend's mother was sleeping, pointed a gun at her, and stole her w…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Separate Offenses cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, defendant below, was convicted by a jury of robbery (Count I) and display of a firearm while committing a felony (Count II). He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on Count I and fifteen years on Count II, the second sentence to run concurrently with the first. Subsequently the court suspended the sen tence on Count II. It is from this conviction and his sentence that defendant appeals.
While attempting to depart from the home of his girlfriend, defendant passed through the living room in which the girl’s mother lay sleeping. The mother awakened, defendant pointed a gun at her, and stole her wallet.
Count I of the information charged defendant with taking the wallet and the cash therein. During the course of trial, the girlfriend’s father testified that another $150 in cash, a watch and a gold cross were also missing from the house. Before closing arguments, defense counsel requested the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony regarding the cash, watch and cross as pertaining to a separate offense not charged in the information. The request was denied. Defense counsel renewed his request for a curative instruction and moved for a mistrial in the alternative. Both motions were denied.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to instruct the jury to disregard a collateral crime or in the alternative to declare a mistrial; that since the adjudication of guilt on Count I is void, the trial court erred in adjudicating defendant guilty on Count II because conviction on Count II is dependent on conviction on Count I; and that the court erred in entering a suspended sentence on Count II since both convictions arose from the same transaction.
In regard to defendant’s first contention, the record reveals that the defense never objected to the elicitation of the testimony herein challenged as immaterial and prejudicial, nor moved to strike it. On the contrary, defense counsel extensively cross examined three prosecution witnesses on the issue of the missing property in an effort to impeach their credibility. This combination of failure to raise timely objections and exploitation for impeachment value is sufficient of itself to vitiate defendant’s argument. See Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 105 So. 834 (1925); Taylor v. State, 289 So. 2d 421 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). But the record also reveals that the actual instructions given the jury defined the law in a manner sufficient to encompass the substance of the requested charge. Refusal to give a requested charge when it is covered by charges given is not error. Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla.3d DCA 1971); White v. State, 324 So. 2d 115 (Fla.3d DCA 1975), cert. dism., 339 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.1976); Zuberi v. State, 343 So. 2d 664 (Fla.3d DCA 1977).
Our finding on the above point obviates the need to discuss defendant’s second contention. As to his final assertion that the sentence on Count II, though suspended, was improper, we note that the offenses charged were violations of separate statutes. Thus the fact that they arose from the same criminal episode is not dispositive of the propriety of the sentence imposed. Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1975); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1975); Johnson v. State, 338 So. 2d 556 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Harris v. State, 338 So. 2d 880 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Williams v. State, 346 So. 2d 67 (Fla.1977).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…f he does not resist. But unless prevented by fear, there must be some resistance to make the taking one done by force or violence. This instruction adequately covered the requirement of resistance in the context of force and fear. Lowman v. State, 353 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [*74] Burley was seventeen years old when he was arrested for the robbery. He argues that the trial court imposed adult sanctions without following the procedures set out in section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979). However, th…
-
Dean v. State, 430 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ailure to give the requested charge; indeed, we find no prejudice is shown on this record in view of the trial court’s more than adequate jury instructions which, in effect, covered the substance of the re [*493] quested charge. See Lowman v. State, 353 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying the defendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress certain evidence obtained pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. We have no trouble in rej…
-
Jones v. State, 532 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…, 1034 (Fla.1974); Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220 (1976); Stanley v. State, 357 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 891 (Fla.1978); Lowman v. State, 353 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). AFFIRMED.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Ciro Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975)
- Jenkins v. Louie L. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1975)
- Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299 (Fla. 1925)
- Alpert v. The Concord Fla., Inc., 343 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- White v. State, 324 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Johnson v. State, 338 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- State v. Luckie Stradtman, 346 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1977)
- Harris v. State, 338 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Holley Curtis Taylor v. State, 289 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)