JUAN BORGIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, including observations of a hand-to-hand transaction in a drug-trafficking area.
Officers observed the defendant in a known drug area at 4:00 a.m. Another individual was seen looking into the defendant's outstretched palm, appearin…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Articulable Suspicion cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals his convictions of possession of cocaine and resisting arrest without violence. We affirm based on the following brief analysis.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those cases which hold that a stop is unconstitutional as being unsupported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity simply because it occurs in an area known for drug activity. See, e.g., Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Walker v. State, 514 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
The defendant here was observed by officers experienced in narcotics arrests in an area known for narcotics trafficking at 4:00 a.m. However, the additional, distinguishing fact present here which entitled the officers to be reasonably suspicious of defendant’s activities is that another individual was seen looking and pointing his index finger into defendant’s outstretched palm. The man appeared to the officers to be sifting through the contents in defendant’s hand attempting to make a selection.
Based on the totality of the circumstances in light of the officers’ experience, the officers could reasonably believe that an illegal drug sale was taking place. Hence, the stop of the defendant and seizure of the substance which was determined to be cocaine were not error. The facts of this case thus distinguish it from Anderson v. State, 576 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), because there, unlike the instant case, the officers did not observe the defendant with an open palm into which another person pointed his finger, shifting and sorting in order to select the contraband to suit his particular need.
Finding defendant’s other points to be without merit, we affirm his convictions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Caicedo, 622 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…y the warrantless arrest of the defendant. First, the officer saw the defendant hesitate prior to removing the object from the other man’s hand. Such a hesitation is consistent with the selection process involved in a drug purchase. Borgis v. State, 590 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Second, the officer observed the defendant place the just-acquired object immediately into his mouth, and testified that in his experience, the mouth is commonly used to carry rock cocaine. See Steele v. State, 561 So. 2d 638 (Fl…
-
Baker v. State, 622 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…shed that the front of the house was hidden from the road by trees and shrubbery. The yard was secluded due to the presence of fencing and shrubs. Choosing a secluded location calculated to avoid discovery may constitute stealth. See Irvin v. State, 590 So. 2d 9 (Fla.3rd DCA 1991) (in prosecution for attempted burglary of a conveyance, stealth instruction was proper under § 810.07(2) where the defendant selected a van parked next to a wall in a deserted parking lot). Accordingly, appellant’s conviction and…
-
S.D. v. State, 837 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…umped the school fence on a Sunday, when the school was closed, without permission from the school staff, and ran away, again jumping over the fence, when an alarm was triggered. This is sufficient to constitute a stealthy entry. See Irvin v. State, 590 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (defining stealthy entry as “[a]ny secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or to remain ... without permission....”); M.S. v. State, 774 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding testimony…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Walker v. State, 514 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Anderson v. State, 576 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)