CHRISTINE VELLANTI, APPELLANT,
v.
RALPH MAERCKS, M.D., AND RALPH MAERCKS, M.D., P.A., APPELLEES
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The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding when the statute of limitations began to run, making summary judgment improper.
Appellant sued her psychiatrist for malpractice. The trial court granted summary judgment for the psychiatrist, finding the statute of limitations beg…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Christine Vellanti (Vellanti), appeals a final summary judgment in favor of appellees, Ralph Maercks and Ralph Maercks, M.D., P.A. (Dr. Maercks). We reverse and remand.
Vellanti sued her psychiatrist, Dr. Maercks, on December 11, 1987, alleging medical malpractice. The trial court found that the two year statute of limitations began to run as of April 5, 1985, because on that date Vellanti signed a writing purporting to release Dr. Maercks from all liability arising out of the treatment. The trial court reasoned that Vellanti must have had actual knowledge of her cause of action when she signed the release and entered summary judgment for Dr. Maercks.
Summary judgment is improper where the pleadings and record reflect conflicting issues of material fact. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Levey v. Getelman, 408 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Vellanti’s signing of the purported release may prove that she had actual knowledge of her cause of action. However, Vellanti also presented evidence possibly indicating that she did not know of her cause of action against her psychiatrist until later. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the action was brought within the two year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1985). Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Norsworthy v. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 598 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…actions had expired as a matter of law prior to the filing of this lawsuit. See, e.g., Tanner v. Hartog, 593 So. 2d 249 (Fla.2d DCA 1992), question certified on motion for reh.; Rogers v. Ruiz, 594 So. 2d 756 (Fla.2d DCA 1991); Vellanti v. Maercks, 590 So. 2d 495 (Fla.3d DCA 1991). Like the other district courts, we find that applying the rule of Barron and Bogorff to the widely divergent fact patterns presented by such cases is not easy. [*107] The Bogorff and Barron decisions are clear that the statute of…
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Gerald v. Keller and Beulah M. Keller, 603 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…f the evidence whether the appellants should have known of the appellee’s error earlier than 1989. Since the date the limitations period began to run is in dispute, this issue of material fact precluded summary judgment. Aprile; Vellanti v. Maercks, 590 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA1991); Branford State Bank v. Hackney Tractor Co., Inc., 455 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA1984). We reject the appellee’s contention, and the trial court’s holding, that the statute of limitations began to run, as a matter of law, on the dat…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Burton Levey v. Getelman, 408 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)