HYSTER COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
MARCOS MORALES, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-12-31
No. 90-1968
Before BARKDULL, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
591 So. 2d 1082 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Hyster Company appealed a trial court's order that vacated its summary judgment in a personal injury case brought by Marcos Morales. The trial court had initially granted Hyster's motion for summary judgment based on a statute of repose, but later granted Morales's motion for relief from judgment, purportedly based on newly discovered evidence in the form of a recent appellate decision. The appellate court reversed, holding that a recent appellate court decision does not constitute newly discovered evidence under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(2).


Holding

A recent appellate court decision does not constitute newly discovered evidence under Rule 1.540(b)(2) and cannot support a motion to vacate a final judgment. Newly discovered evidence must be evidence of specific facts, such as jury foreperson letters or wage and tax statements, not legal decisions that could have been discovered through diligent research.


Headnotes

[1] A motion for rehearing must be filed within ten days of the entry of a final summary judgment to be considered timely.

[2] A trial court loses jurisdiction to entertain a motion for rehearing once the ten-day period prescribed by Rule 1.530 has expired.

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Key Quotes

“the trial court erred in finding that a recent appellate court decision constituted newly discovered evidence”

Establishes the core holding that appellate decisions cannot serve as newly discovered evidence under Rule 1.540(b)(2)

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Facts & Procedural History

Marcos Morales suffered an injury to his hand on December 1, 1986, allegedly caused by one of Hyster's industrial trucks manufactured and delivered in…

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Opinion of the Court
LEVY, Judge.

LEVY, Judge.

Hyster Company [“Hyster”] appeals the trial court’s order of relief vacating the Final Summary Judgment that had been entered in favor of Hyster and against the plaintiff, Marcos Morales, in Morales’s personal injury action.

Marcos Morales brought suit in May of 1989 for an injury to his hand he alleged was caused by one of Hyster’s industrial trucks. The injury occurred on December 1, 1986.

On January 17, 1990, a hearing was held on Hyster’s motion for summary judgment. At the hearing, Hyster argued that Morales’s cause of action was extinguished by the 12-year statute of repose, because the truck was manufactured and delivered in 1964. Hyster further argued that, although the statute of repose was repealed in 1986, the repeal was intended to be applied prospectively and did not extinguish Hyster’s right to immunity from liability. The trial court granted Hyster’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s Final Summary Judgment was filed on January 19, 1990.

On January 30, 1990, 11 days after the trial court filed its Final Summary Judgment, Morales filed a Motion for Rehearing and/or to Strike Final Summary Judgment. The ten-day period in which to file such a motion, under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, expired on January 29, 1990. Hyster filed a motion to strike Morales’s motion for rehearing and argued that Morales’s motion was untimely because it was not served within the ten-day period provided by Rule 1.530.

On February 27, 1990, the trial court held hearings on the parties’ motions and denied Morales’s motion for rehearing pursuant to Rule 1.530. During these hearings, the trial court, however, entertained Morales’s oral motion for relief from judgment on the basis of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(2) where Morales argued the existence of newly discovered evidence in the form of a recent appellate decision. Finding that a recent appellate court decision constituted newly discovered evidence, the trial court granted Morales’s motion to strike the Final Summary Judgment and ordered the cause to proceed to trial on the merits.

We reverse.

Hyster appeals the trial court’s granting of Morales’s oral motion for relief. Morales filed his Motion for Rehearing And/Or To Strike Final Summary Judgment on January 30, 1990, which was 11 days after the trial court filed its Final Summary Judgment. On that date, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain such a motion. Pursuant to Rule 1.530, Morales was required to file his motion for a rehearing no later than January 29, 1990.

With respect to Morales’s oral motion for relief from the Final Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(2), the trial court erred in finding that a recent appellate court decision constituted newly discovered evidence. See State v. Kurns, 397 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981); Zerman v. Jacobs, 113 F.R.D. 13 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (court held recent appellate court decision not newly discovered evidence and could not support motion to vacate judgment on that basis).

The finding of a new appellate court decision does not meet the criteria of Rule 1.540(b)(2).

Compare Snook v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 485 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (jury foreperson’s letter alleging jury considered improper evidence constitutes newly discovered evidence); and Kline v. Belco, Ltd., 480 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (wage and tax statements supporting injured person’s testimony regarding employment constituted newly discovered evidence), review denied 491 So. 2d 278 (Fla.1986).

Accordingly, the order granting Morales’ Motion for Relief From Judgment, purportedly entered pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(2), is reversed with this cause being remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Hernandez v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 695 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …n case no. 96-2907, must be vacated as entered untimely and without jurisdiction. Volumes in Value, Inc. v. Buy Mail Int'l Inc., 177 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); see Catsicas v. Catsicas, 669 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Hyster Co. v. Morales, 591 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); DePadro v. Moore, 215 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), cert. denied, 222 So. 2d 748 (Fla.1969); Lee v. Elliott, 155 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Notwithstanding, upon consideration of the plaintiffs initial appeal, we reverse th…
  • Catsicas v. Catsicas, 669 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …R.Civ.P. 1.090(b). Because the March motion for rehearing was untimely, the trial court was [*1128] without jurisdiction to grant it. See Meyer v. Meyer, 525 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 244 (Fla.1988); Hyster Co. v. Morales, 591 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). We reverse the trial court’s order granting rehearing, reinstate the final judgment filed on February 8, 1995 and remand to the trial court. DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.…

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