THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES A. COMMONS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appeals the dismissal of a concealed weapons charge against Commons, an employee at a supermarket. The Third District affirms the dismissal, holding that section 790.25(3)(n) exempts a person from the concealed weapons statute when possessing arms at their place of business, including premises where they are employed by another.
Section 790.25(3)(n) exempts a person from criminal liability for carrying a concealed firearm at their place of business, including premises where the person is employed by another. No statutory requirement for employer permission exists, and the court has no power to create one.
[1] A person possessing arms at his place of business is exempt from statutes prohibiting the carrying of concealed firearms.
[2] The exception for possessing arms at a place of business applies to employees, not solely to business owners.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 790.25(3)(n) must be read in pari materia with section 790.01(2) and, thus read, makes it lawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm in his home”
Establishes the interpretive principle that statutory exemptions apply to the concealed weapons prohibition when read together
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn June 14, 1990, Charles Commons was inside Zhara Supermarket, where he was employed as a grocer. Police observed a bulge on Commons, searched him, a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse In Pari Materia Statutory Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The state appeals from an order granting a Rule 3.190(c)(4) sworn motion to dismiss an information for carrying a concealed firearm in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989),1 based on the un-traversed showing
that on June 14, 1990, he was inside his place of business, Zhara Supermarket, where he is employed as a grocer, when the police observed a bulge on the Defendant, searched the Defendant, and arrested him for carrying a concealed firearm.
The trial court concluded that the statute did not apply to the appellant because of the exception contained in section 790.- 25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1989),2 which insulates a person “possessing arms at his ... place of business.” We affirm.
This result is mandated by our decision in Cockin v. State, 453 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in which we held that section 790.25(3)(n) must be read in pari materia with section 790.01(2) and, thus read, makes it lawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm in his home. Accord Facion v. State, 290 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); French v. State, 279 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). But cf. State v. Bryant, 373 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (§ 790.25(3)(Z) no defense to carrying a concealed weapon). The same holding obviously applies to the other exception in § 790.25(3)(n), which applies to the defendant’s “place of business.”
Moreover, this language is not, as the state contends, confined to a place of business owned by the defendant himself. To the contrary, it includes, as in this case, premises where the individual is employed by another. Idelett v. State, 14 Ga.App. 501, 502, 81 S.E. 379, 380 (1914) (“Certainly it cannot be contended that, even though one is a mere farm laborer, he should be left defenseless (at the place of business where he is compelled to work) against an unlawful and felonious attack which he might have good reason to apprehend, unless he sees proper, and likewise has the opportunity, to obtain a license to carry his pistol, and yet the more favored landowner not be subjected to such a requirement.”); Miller v. State, 12 Ga.App. 479, 77 S.E. 653 (1913); Poston v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 317, 104 S.W. 2d 516 (Tex.Crim.App.1937). See generally Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla.1973).
Finally, the appellant claims that one is protected from criminal responsibility under these circumstances only if he obtains the permission of his employer to carry a concealed gun. There is no statutory authority for such a requirement and we have no power to create one ourselves. See Jones v. State, 589 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Affirmed.
. 790.01 Carrying concealed weapons.—
**
(2) Whoever shall carry a concealed firearm on or about his person shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
. 790.25 Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.—
**
(3) LAWFUL USES — The provisions of ss. 790.053 and 790.06 do not apply in the following instances, and despite such sections, it is lawful for the following persons to own, possess, and lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and supplies for lawful purposes:
**
(n) A person possessing arms at his home or place of business.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Allie Brook v. State, 999 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…pply to 790.01, it would have included similar language so stating. However, if the legislature agreed with the Florida Supreme Court’s 1973 interpretation in Peoples, it would have deemed such additional amendment unnecessary. In State v. Commons, 592 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the Third District affirmed a(c)(4) dismissal order in holding that the defendant, employed as a grocer at a supermarket, did not violate section 790.01 by carrying a concealed firearm on his person while at the supermarket. In d…
-
State v. Torrence Little, 104 So. 3d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…ption. The Third District found that the “place of business” exception was not “confined to a place of business owned by the defendant himself. To the contrary, it includes ... premises where the individual is employed by another.” State v. Commons, 592 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The Fifth District determined that the “place of business” exception applied when the defendant was at the place of business during non-working hours. Brook, 999 So. 2d at 1094, 1097. We turn now to the state’s contention t…
Authorities Cited
- Cataldo v. Rader & Assocs., 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1973)
- Avery Jones v. State, 589 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- French v. State, 279 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- State v. Bryant, 373 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Facion v. State, 290 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Cockin v. State, 453 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)