BRUCE DUNBAR, F/K/A MICHAEL DUNBAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the search of the defendant's automobile was illegal because it was conducted during an unlawful detention after the initial traffic stop was completed.
An officer stopped a defendant for a noisy automobile, found his documents in order, and returned them, stating he was free to go. The officer then re…
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LEHAN, Acting Chief Judge.
We reverse defendant’s convictions and sentences for trafficking in cocaine and possession of cannabis. We agree with his contention that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the drugs found in defendant’s automobile by officers after the automobile was stopped. The search was conducted during an illegal detention.
The stop occurred because defendant’s automobile was making a noise. The officer asked defendant about the noise, and, after checking the defendant’s license and registration, found them to be in order and returned them to defendant. No citation was issued. The officer then told defendant he was free to go and wished him luck on his journey. In fact, the officer agreed with defense counsel that when the officer handed the documents back to the defendant, he was “done with [his] business” relating to the initial stop, he was “satisfied that there was ... nothing wrong with the vehicle that necessitated it remaining at the scene ... ”, and that “it was safe for [the defendant] to go ahead and leave in the vehicle.”
Thereafter, the officer called to the defendant, who had started to return to the automobile, and requested permission to conduct a search of the automobile. The officer stated that if defendant refused, a drug-sniffing dog would be used.
Notwithstanding the “request” the defendant was obviously detained because he was not free to go. The officer had no articulable evidence of criminal activity to justify the detention of defendant after the officer had been satisfied that no traffic violation had occurred and that defendant’s documents were in order. The continued detention of defendant thereafter was illegal, thus rendering illegal the search. See Joseph v. State, 588 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 11, 1991). See also Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla.1990).
The convictions are reversed. Defendant shall be discharged.
FRANK and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
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Watts v. State, 788 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…, asking if he had any drugs or weapons, the officers testified otherwise, stating that as Watts was walking away, one of them asked him if they could search him. Watts did not testify that either of the officers threatened him. See Dunbar v. State, 592 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Neither did Watts testify that either of the officers used threatening words or a threatening tone of voice. In fact, Watts testified that he did not recall the tone they used in speaking to him. An appellate court “should not ov…
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Howard v. State, 645 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…the initial stop has been effected, the officer must release that defendant. See § 901.151 Fla.Stat. (1993). Any further detention of that defendant would be illegal and would render any search, even if consensual, illegal as well. Dunbar v. State, 592 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). ■ In the instant case, however, while the initial purpose for the traffic stop, suspicion that the vehicle had been stolen, had been dissipated, the continued detention was justified by the discovery' of the invalid driver’s li…
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Powell v. State, 649 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…e initial stop, he would have conducted an exterior search with the K-9 unit because, Cumbess testified, he did so in virtually all traffic stops. A continued detention is illegal if the reason for the initial stop is resolved. See Dunbar v. State, 592 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Joseph v. State, 588 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We recognize that the testimony in this case is not as clear as the evidence in Dunbar and Joseph that the reason for the initial stop was resolved, but the uncertainty in the…
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- Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990)
- Sanon v. Joseph, 588 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)