DAVID WESLEY BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Wesley Brown appeals his convictions for burglary of a conveyance, robbery, and false imprisonment arising from a liquor truck hijacking. The court affirmed, holding that Brown's silence during police questioning did not constitute an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent, and his subsequent voluntary statements were properly admitted.
The court held that Brown's non-responsive behavior during questioning did not constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent. Absent an affirmative manifestation of a desire to remain silent, the privilege is not invoked, and Brown's voluntary statements after being advised of his rights were properly admitted.
[1] A defendant's non-responsive behavior during police questioning does not constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent.
[2] In the absence of an affirmative manifestation of a desire to remain silent, it is presumed the privilege has not been invoked.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the absence of some affirmative manifestation of a desire to remain silent, it is presumed that the privilege has not been invoked.”
Establishes the legal standard that silence alone is insufficient to invoke Miranda rights; an affirmative statement or clear indication is required.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was arrested in connection with a liquor truck hijacking. After being advised of his Miranda rights, police questioned him, but he did not respo…
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GERSTEN, Judge.
Appellant, David Wesley Brown, appeals his convictions and sentence for burglary of a conveyance, robbery, and false imprisonment. We affirm.
Appellant was arrested in connection with the hijacking of a liquor truck. After advising him of his Miranda rights, the police questioned appellant about his participation in the hijacking. The detective terminated the interview because appellant did not respond to questioning.
Appellant was then transported to the jail. On his way to the jail, appellant told the detective that he was the “brains of the whole thing,” that “he had used [the co-defendant] to do the robbery,” but that it “was [the co-defendant] the guy with the gun.”
Appellant moved to suppress these statements. The trial court denied appellant’s motion finding that appellant did not exercise his right to remain silent or to obtain counsel. Appellant was convicted based on substantial evidence which included three eyewitness identifications at trial.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress statements to police after he had indicated that he did not want to speak. Appellee asserts that appellant did not invoke his right to remain silent.
We find that appellant’s non-responsive behavior while being questioned does not constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975); United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F. 2d 809 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874, 103 S.Ct. 165, 74 L.Ed.2d 137 (1982); United States v. Menichino, 497 F. 2d 935 (5th Cir.1974).
In the absence of some affirmative manifestation of a desire to remain silent, it is presumed that the privilege has not been invoked. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); Rodriguez v. State, 559 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Here, there was a concrete affirmative manifestation to communicate with police after being advised of his rights — he voluntarily spoke about the crime. See Avila v. State, 545 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Walker v. State, 484 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Finally, because the evidence against appellant was overwhelming, we find any error to have been harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
Affirmed.
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McGEE v. State, 762 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389 (Fla.1994); Paul v. State, 742 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Brown v. State, 592 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980)
- United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1975)
- Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (U.S. 1980)
- United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974)
- United States v. Homero Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1982)
- Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 459 U.S. 874 (U.S. 1982)
- Palmere v. United States, 459 U.S. 874 (U.S. 1982)
- Avila v. State, 545 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Rodgers v. State, 559 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)