RICHARD L. DUGGER, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STANLEY STEVEN ANDERSON, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Corrections appealed an order granting provisional credits to an inmate on a sentence preceding a habitual offender conviction. The court affirmed, holding that the statutory exception for provisional credits applies only to sentences imposed as habitual offender sentences, not to earlier sentences that precede such a conviction.
An inmate is eligible for provisional credits on a sentence imposed prior to a habitual offender sentence. The statutory exception in section 944.277(1)(g) applies only to sentences imposed as habitual offender sentences or previously imposed as habitual offender sentences, not to earlier unrelated sentences.
[1] A statute creating a system of provisional credits may except inmates sentenced as habitual offenders.
[2] The exception for habitual offenders in a provisional credit statute applies to inmates sentenced under the relevant state law or previously sentenced as a habitual offen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 944.277(l)(g) applies if an inmate 'is ... or has previously been sentenced' as a habitual offender in Florida (under section 775.084, Florida Statutes). This language contrasts with the reference to an inmate who has been sentenced 'at any time' as a habitual offender in another jurisdiction.”
Establishes the temporal requirement in the statute and the court's method of statutory interpretation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnderson received a 30-month sentence in case no. 81-4875. Subsequently, he received a five-year habitual offender sentence in case no. 88-11520, whic…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, as Secretary of the Department of Corrections (the department), appeals an order establishing that the appellee is eligible for provisional credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes, on a sentence which precedes a habitual offender sentence.1 We conclude that the lower court properly construed the statute in determining that the appellee is eligible for provisional credits.
The appellee received a 30-month sentence in case no. 81-4875. He subsequently received a five-year sentence as a habitual offender in case no. 88-11520. The habitual offender sentence is consecutive to the appellee’s earlier sentence. The department established the appellee’s maximum release date, and a tentative release date with basic and additional gain time. However, the department declined to allow any provisional credits to be used in the release date computations, relying on the exception in section 944.277(l)(g) for an inmate who “is sentenced” as a habitual offender. Section 944.277 creates a system of provisional credits but excepts, at subsection (l)(g), an inmate who:
Is sentenced, or has previously been sentenced, under s. 775.084, or has been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction as a habitual offender. The statute imposes a temporal requirement with regard to the habitual offender exception. Section 944.277(l)(g) applies if an inmate “is ... or has previously been sentenced” as a habitual offender in Florida (under section 775.084, Florida Statutes). This language contrasts with the reference to an inmate who has been sentenced “at any time” as a habitual offender in another jurisdiction. Because the appel-lee’s sentence in case no. 81-4875 was im posed prior to the habitual offender sentence in case no. 88-11520, it is not within the temporal sequence suggested by the statutory language.
The order is affirmed.
ZEHMER, BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur. . This court has considered, on its own motion, the question of its jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Although the appellee sought a writ of mandamus as the petitioner below, the appealed order indicates that the lower tribunal was confident that the appellant, as the respondent below, would comply with the directives of the order. The formal issuance of the writ was therefore withheld. We regard this language as surplusage, and recognize that the issuance of the writ was withheld as a courtesy to the respondent, as the head of an agency of the executive branch of state government. The lower tribunal expected its order to be an end to the judicial labor in the cause and we find it to be sufficiently final for us to review it under the authority of article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Leftwich v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 148 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 2014)…Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988) (emphasis added). The DOC interpreted the statute to render an inmate ineligible to receive further provisional credits on any sentence once that inmate received a habitual offender sentence. See generally Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So. 2d 1134, 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In 1992, the First District held that the language “is ... or has previously been sentenced” with respect to a sentence imposed pursuant to the Florida habitual offender statute contrasted with the language “at any time” u…
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McBRIDE v. Moore, 780 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…e remains eligible for provisional credits on the original sentence despite his habitual offender status, because the habitual offender sentence was not imposed until after he had begun serving the original sentence. He relies on Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which this court held that, under section 944.277(l)(g), the defendant’s habitual offender status did not adversely affect his right to provisional credits on an earlier imposed sentence. We reasoned that, “because the appell…
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McBRIDE v. State, 601 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction as a habitual offender.... The language in subsection 7 has been construed under a related statute, section 944.-277(1)(g), which deals with eligibility for provisional credits. See Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). There, the court found that the language of subsection 7 imposed “a temporal requirement on the habitual offender exception.” 593 So. 2d at 1134. The court held that the prisoner was eligible for provisional credits on a sentenc…
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