LEWIS EDWARD TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lewis Edward Taylor, a juvenile, was convicted of two counts of second-degree felony extortion for making threatening telephone calls. The appellate court affirmed his conviction but reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to comply with statutory requirements for imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile defendant.
The conviction is affirmed as supported by competent substantial evidence. However, the case is reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court's order failed to comply with Section 39.111(7) of the Florida Statutes, which requires written findings addressing six enumerated criteria with specific reasons for imposing adult sanctions.
[1] A conviction for felony extortion is supported by competent substantial evidence if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
[2] A trial court's order imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile defendant must be in writing and conform to specific statutory criteria.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.111(7)(d), F.S. (1989), requires any decision imposing sanctions to be written, to conform with each of the six criteria enumerated in Section 39.111(7)(c), and to include specific findings of fact and the reasons for the decision.”
Establishes the statutory requirements for imposing adult sanctions on juveniles that the trial court must follow.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor, a juvenile, made two telephone calls to his girlfriend suggesting that if she dropped pending battery charges against him, Taylor's mother wou…
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[*1148] SHIVERS, Judge.
Taylor, a juvenile at the time of the offenses, appeals from a judgment and sentence adjudicating and sentencing him as an adult on two counts of second-degree felony extortion pursuant to Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1989). His crime was making two telephone calls suggesting that if his girlfriend would drop pending battery charges against him, Taylor’s mother would not file statutory rape charges against the girlfriend. Taylor’s conviction on both counts is supported by competent substantial evidence and we affirm his conviction. We reverse and remand, however, for resentencing.
After Taylor’s conviction, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and a pre-disposition report (PDR). The order finding Taylor suitable for the imposition of adult sanctions states the following reasons: “1. The child is in the adult system for Extortion (two counts). The Defendant has been in the juvenile system on prior occasions for petit larceny, and has not been able to perform within the restrictions imposed by community control. The juvenile system has been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the Defendant.
2.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the Defendant is suitable for the imposition of adult sanctions and that the protection of the community requires adult disposition. It is thereupon ORDERED, that the Defendant be sentenced in accordance with adult sanctions.” The order fails to meet the express requirements of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, which sets forth procedures for determining whether adult sanctions are suitable for a child defendant convicted of a crime.
Section 39.111(7)(d), F.S. (1989), requires any decision imposing sanctions to be written, to conform with each of the six criteria enumerated in Section 39.111(7)(c), and to include specific findings of fact and the reasons for the decision. The failure of an order to address one of the criteria, even if the other five are included, requires a reversal and remand. See Franklin v. State, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
The order at issue is deficient with respect to several of the statutory criteria. Because we find that the trial court failed to fully comply with Section 39.111(7), we reverse and remand for resentencing. See State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984); Wiley v. State, 582 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Franklin; Martin v. State, 547 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Banks v. State, 488 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Upon remand, the trial court must consider each of the six criteria listed in Section 39.111(7)(c), and reduce the decision to writing with specific findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sanction, in accordance with Section 39.111(7)(d).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOOTH and MINER, JJ., concur.
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Troutman v. State, 603 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…of the above criteria,” and that the “court shall render a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions.” Failure of the written order to comply with these requirements requires reversal. E.g., Taylor v. State, 593 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). I am unable to join in the majority’s decision to affirm because the order under review does not address each of the mandatory criteria and thus does not comply with the statutory requirements.…1 / 2
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Kendrick Bernard Hill v. State, 605 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…writing, must address each of the six factors enumerated in section 39.059(7)(c), and must include specific findings of fact and the reasons for the decision. Failure to address even one of the criteria requires reversal and remand. Taylor v. State, 593 So. 2d 1147, 1148 (Fla.. 1st DCA 1992). See also Hope v. State, 562 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Martin v. State, 547 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Franklin v. State, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Flowers v. State, 546 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).…
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Trueblood v. State, 610 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ally correlated to each offense. In this case, the applicability of each written finding to the burglary offense is clear. However, the omission of a single finding, even if the other five are included, requires reversal and remand. Taylor v. State, 593 So. 2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Although the written order may be read in pari materia with the sentencing transcript to determine if all of the required findings were, in fact, made, Troutman, we find that in this case they were not. The trial judge he…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- Martin v. State, 547 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Martin v. Hoover, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Gentry v. State, 488 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Wiley v. State, 582 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)