LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL H. SAGER, ALENE MARTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A CENTURY 21 REAL ESTATE, LEONARD GRANT, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A CENTURY 21 REAL ESTATE, BILL STARK AND DICK STEELE, TAX COLLECTOR, APPELLEES
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Lee County initiated eminent domain proceedings and made an offer of judgment of $123,900. When the jury verdict was $122,000 (below the offer), the trial court added statutory interest of $5,509, resulting in a total judgment of $127,509. The court held that prejudgment interest is part of the compensation for comparison purposes, so the County's offer was properly struck and the landowners remain eligible for attorney's fees and costs.
Prejudgment interest is an integral part of full compensation in eminent domain proceedings and must be included in determining the final award for comparison to the offer of judgment. Therefore, the trial court properly struck the County's offer of judgment, and the landowners remain eligible for attorney's fees and costs.
[1] Prejudgment interest is an integral part of full compensation in eminent domain proceedings.
[2] An offer of judgment in a condemnation proceeding is presumed to include all elements of damage attributable to the taking, including damages from deprivation of the use…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Prejudgment interest is an integral part of "full compensation" in eminent domain proceedings.”
Establishes the foundational principle that interest is a necessary component of compensation, not a separate add-on
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLee County filed a condemnation petition on May 25, 1989, to acquire a portion of the landowners' property and simultaneously served an offer of judgm…
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FRANK, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order striking Lee County’s offer of judgment.
The County initiated condemnation proceedings in accordance with Chapters 73 and 74, Florida Statutes, on May 25, 1989, to acquire a portion of the landowners’ property. On the same day that the petition was filed, the County served the landowners with an offer of judgment pursuant to rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987), in the amount of $123,900, exclusive of costs and fees.1 The landowners did not file an acceptance within thirty days, thus the offer was deemed rejected. On February 22, 1991, the jury, instructed not to consider the interest factor in determining an award, returned a verdict valuing the property at $122,000, $1,900 below the offer. Thereafter, the trial court supplemented the verdict with statutory interest of $5,509, computed pursuant to section 74.061, Florida Statutes (1987), the relevant portion of which states as follows:
Compensation shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of chapter 73, except that interest shall be allowed at the same rate as provided in all circuit court judgments from the date of surrender of possession to the date of payment on the amount that the verdict exceeds the estimate of value set forth in the declaration of taking.
Thus the final judgment resulted in an award to the landowners of $127,509. The County contends that the verdict amount only, $122,000, is the figure to which the offer is compared for purposes of awarding fees or costs. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
Prejudgment interest is an integral part of “full compensation” in eminent domain proceedings. Behm v. State, Department of Transportation, 383 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1980). When a governmental authority submits an offer of judgment in a sum certain, that amount is taken to mean that it includes all elements of damage attributable to the condemnor’s taking, “including the damages resulting from deprivation of the use of the money.” Encompass Inc. v. Alford, 444 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984). Hence, the prejudgment interest is a part of the judgment in determining whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987). See Phillips v. Parrish, 585 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The trial court was correct in striking the offer of judgment.
We affirm.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. . Section 73.092(7) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner, pursuant to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure, is either rejected or expires and the verdict or judgment is less than or equal to the offer of judgment, no attorney’s fees or costs shall be awarded for time spent by the attorney or costs incurred after the time of rejection or expiration of the offer.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Baker Protective Servs. v. FP Inc. & Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 659 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…tes.” Phillips v. Parrish, 585 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); accord Persons v. Pelaez, 613 So. 2d 509, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (applying the prejudgment interest rule in Phillips to settlement offers under Section 45.061); cf. Lee County v. Sager, 595 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1992) (stating that "prejudgment interest is a part of the judgment in determining whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092(7), F…
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Hartleb v. State, 677 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…Subsequently, an apportionment hearing is conducted to determine the respective rights of the respondents in the award. Bolduc; State Road Dept. v. Thibaut, 190 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. denied, 196 So. 2d 922 (1967); Lee County v. Sager, 595 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1992); Division of Admin., State of Fla. v. Allen, 447 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Here, there being no indication in the offer that Appellant’s recovery would be free and clear of the respondent…
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Persons v. Arnaldo Pelaez, 613 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…rict noted: “Since prejudgment interest is merely another element of damages, it is properly included in determining whether a judgment is so deficient as to activate the provisions of section 768.79, Florida Statutes.” See also Lee County v. Sager, 595 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (“prejudgment interest is a part of the judgment in determining whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987)”). This analysis is equally…
Authorities Cited
- Behm v. Division OF Administration, 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980)
- Encompass Inc. v. Alford, 444 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Phillips v. Parrish, 585 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)