FREDDIE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1992-04-08
No. 90-1641
HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur., FARMER, J., concurring specially with opinion.
596 So. 2d 791 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court affirmed the disposition but noted the trial judge's authority issue was not preserved for appeal.


Facts & Procedural History

Defendant was convicted of a felony and sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial judge was a county judge acting as a circuit judge under a temporary…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Freddie Williams appeals both his conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell within one thousand feet of a school and his life sentence as a habitual felony offender under section 775.-084(4)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm in all respects, but remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of Williams’s life sentence. Until recently, a conflict existed among the district courts of this State whether section 775.084(4)(a)1 required a mandatory life sentence. E.g., Henry v. State, 581 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (holding that a life sentence is permissive); State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (holding that a life sentence is mandatory). In Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), the Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict. The court held “that sentencing under sections 775.084(4)(a)1 and 775.084(4)(b)1 is permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 271.

Because the trial judge in the subject action was unsure whether he had discretion to sentence Williams to life imprisonment once he determined Williams was a habitual felony offender, this case is remanded for the trial judge to reconsider Williams’s sentence in light of the supreme court’s decision in Burdick.

AFFIRMED, BUT REMANDED FOR SENTENCING RECONSIDERATION.

HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. FARMER, J., concurring specially with opinion.

Concurrence
FARMER, Judge,

FARMER, Judge,

specially concurring.

I agree with the court’s disposition. Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), makes it clear that a life sentence under section 775.084(4)(a)1 and (4)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1991), is permissive rather than mandatory. The trial judge should be given a fresh chance to reconsider the life sentence in light of Burdick, so I concur with the remand.

My purpose in writing is only to note that I would have voted to reverse this conviction, however, because the trial judge — a county judge acting as a circuit judge — lacked the authority to preside over a felony trial. This “division” of the circuit court in which he sat is staffed exclusively by a succession of county judges, each serving “temporary” assignments of 5 months and 29 days. To me, that can hardly be deemed anything other than an attempt to avoid Payret v. Adams, 500 So. 2d 136 (Fla.1986), which invalidated a permanent assignment of the same county judge to preside over a “division” of the circuit court sitting in the Glades district of Palm Beach County.

The only difference here is that, instead of the same county judge, the plan involves a rotation of county judges. In either event, however, the effect is the same. A “division” of the circuit court is permanently presided over by a county judge. A criminal defendant charged with a crime that could — as, indeed, it ultimately did— result in life imprisonment, is tried before a county judge rather than the circuit judge our law requires. See § 26.012(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1991). In our constitutional system, administrative convenience often collides with limitations on the power of the officers of government.

Defendant’s appellate arguments on this issue are too late, however. He failed to make this objection below. Stein v. Foster, 557 So. 2d 861 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990), is clear that objections of this kind must first be raised in the trial court. The failure to do so prevents us from taking it up now. My only purpose in commenting on the subject is to alert the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit that at least one judge in the little, red-brick building across town perceives a problem in his imaginative use of county judges to create an additional circuit judge that the legislature has declined to give him.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
    …same relief as the defendant in Stephens. As Johnson has pointed out, this court granted Burdick relief to other defendants whose direct appeals were contemporary with Johnson’s. Adams v. State, 617 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Williams v. State, 596 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). In fact, our Williams decision was cited by Johnson’s appellate counsel on direct appeal. The record discloses factors supporting a sentence significantly less than Johnson’s life sentence. The trial court failed to understand…
  • Adams v. State, 617 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
    …hus, the trial court has the discretion to impose any sentence up to life imprisonment for a first degree felony. If the trial court decides that such a sentence is not necessary, it does not have to impose such a severe sentence. Williams v. State, 596 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The state concedes that the trial court felt it had no choice other than to enhance the defendant’s sentence, under section 775.084(4)(b). We find no error in the other points on appeal. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENC…
  • Davis v. State, 643 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …dge intended to impose two consecutive life sentences. Instead, this court remanded for the trial judge to reconsider the appellant’s sentences in light of Burdick and King. See Tucker v. State, 595 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1992). See also Williams v. State, 596 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). [*81] We, accordingly, reverse the appellant’s two consecutive life sentences and again remand for the trial court to reconsider the appellant’s sentences in light of Burdick and King. At resentencing, the trial court must of co…

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