EARL M. BARKER, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
JOY M. BARKER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the final judgment of dissolution must be reversed and remanded because it failed to properly address the division of furnishings and personal effects and did not comply with statutory requirements regarding valuation dates and explicit findings for equitable distribution.
The former husband appealed a final judgment of dissolution, arguing that the trial court erred in its division of furnishings and personal effects an…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Valuation Date For Marital Assets cases and more on FLexlaw
SHIVERS, Judge.
The former husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution. We reverse and remand.
Appellant argues that this case should be remanded to divide the furnishings and personal effects. Appellee concedes this point, and we agree. See section 61.075(1), Florida State (1989). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court to reconsider the entire equitable scheme. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 583 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Breland v. Breland, 565 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
The former husband further correctly asserts that the final judgment does not comply with section 61.075(4), Florida Statutes (1989), because it does not state the date used to determine marital assets and liabilities. On remand the trial court must “use the petition [for dissolution] filing date as the valuation date for the marital assets unless the court makes a determination in the final judgment pursuant to the statute that a date other than the filing date is just and equitable under the circumstances.” Bauzon v. Bauzon, 588 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Moreover, we are unable to determine the basis upon which the trial court distributed the marital assets. It is “appropriate to require explicit findings with respect to disputed facts that form the factual basis on which a trial court undertakes to award equitable distribution.” Barrs v. Barrs, 505 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). On remand the trial court is directed to make such findings in order to effectuate meaningful appellate review. E.g., Prom v. Prom, 589 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ZEHMER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
City OF Sweetwater v. Solo Constr. Corp., 823 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ter. As the lowest responsive, responsible bidder, Solo has suffered an injury which is different than that of the community as a whole and does not have an adequate remedy at law. Mid-American Waste Systems of Florida, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 596 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), Miami-Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). 11. There is a great public interest in ensuring that contracts be awarded to effectuate the intent of the competitive bid laws. See Engineeri…
Authorities Cited
- Barrs v. Barrs, 505 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Prom v. Prom, 589 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Sweeney v. Noemi J. Sweeney, 583 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Breland v. Breland, 565 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Williams v. State, 588 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Antonietta Bauzon v. Bauzon, 588 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)