JAMES CATON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Catón was convicted of battery on a booking officer at a county jail, but the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial judge improperly restricted cross-examination intended to show the officer's bias by revealing his potential motive to pursue charges (fear of a civil excessive-force lawsuit). The court reaffirmed the fundamental right to broad cross-examination of key state witnesses.
The trial judge's restriction on cross-examination was improper and not harmless error. Catón had a fundamental right to cross-examine the key state witness about potential bias, including the officer's possible ulterior motive stemming from fear of civil liability.
[1] A defendant has a right to cross-examine a key state witness to show bias, prejudice, or interest.
[2] The existence of a civil suit by a witness against a criminal defendant is relevant to show potential bias in the criminal trial.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is fundamental that "[a]ll witnesses are subject to cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting them by showing bias, prejudice or interest * * *. This is especially so where a key state witness is being cross-examined."”
Establishes the fundamental right to cross-examine key state witnesses for bias
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCatón was arrested and during booking, he and the officer ended up on the floor in a physical altercation. Catón was unconscious for a period of time.…
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FARMER, Judge.
Once again we reverse a conviction because a trial judge unduly restricted cross-examination to show bias of a key state witness. In this case, defendant was charged with battery of a booking officer at the county jail shortly after defendant’s arrest on other charges. After the booking, and while the defendant and the booking officer were alone in the cell, they both ended up on the floor. Catón was unconscious for some period of time, a fact conceded by the officer. Catón and the officer told sharply diverging stories about the incident. The officer described Catón as abusive and belligerent. When he tried to have Catón sit on the cell bench, Catón grabbed him and both fell to the floor in the ensuing fight. When he realized that Catón had sustained a head injury from the altercation, he summoned medical attention. On the other side, Ca-tón said that the officer knocked his glasses off while removing his restraints. Ca-tón then sought to catch the glasses before they could fall to the floor, whereupon the officer threw him down and kicked him in the head.
At trial, defendant sought to cross-examine the officer about his motive for pursuing the battery charge against him. The trial judge sustained the state’s objection. Specifically, the trial judge did not allow Catón to question the officer about fears that Catón would sue him in a civil suit for using excessive force in the incident.
Cases discussing the broad latitude of cross-examination to show bias of important state witnesses are legion. As we said, e.g., in Cox v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983):
It is fundamental that “[a]ll witnesses are subject to cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting them by showing bias, prejudice or interest * * *. This is especially so where a key state witness is being cross-examined.” [citations omitted] Furthermore, “the existence of a civil suit by a witness against a criminal defendant is relevant to show such potential bias in the criminal trial.”
441 So. 2d at 1170.
To the same effect is Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), where Judge Stone, writing for the court, said:
The defendant has a right to discredit a witness by showing bias, an interest, and a possible ulterior motive for his testimony. E.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Lavette v. State, 442 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), pet. for rev. denied, 449 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1984). A condition of [the witness’s] probation was that he not possess firearms. However, the trial court would not allow the defendant to cross-examine the witness about his probationary status. We cannot say that this error was harmless, [e.o.]
572 So. 2d at 17. More recently we said:
A wide range of cross-examination is usually allowed of the state’s witnesses, [citation omitted] A defendant has a strong interest in discrediting a crucial state’s witness by showing bias, an interest in the outcome, or a possible ulterior motive for his in-court testimony.,
Auchmuty v. State, 594 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
We are unable to conclude that this restriction on cross-examination was harmless and thus we reverse for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
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Purcell v. State, 735 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…1992); see also Perez v. State, 691 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Stanley v. State, 648 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Pomeranz v. State, 634 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Taylor v. State, 623 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Caton v. State, 597 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Cox v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Bias may be proved by animus or prejudice against the defendant, an int…
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Ford Michael v. State, 884 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Nardone v. State, 798 So. 2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). “The defendant has a right to discredit a witness by showing bias, an interest, and a possible ulterior motive for his testimony,” Caton v. State, 597 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (quoting [*85] Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)), and denial of the right to full cross-examination in matters relevant to credibility may easily constitute reversible error. Hinojosa, 857 So. 2d at 3…
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Mosley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…Same Transaction, 98 A.L.R.3d 1060 (1980). Where the defendant suffered serious injuries in the altercation, the defense may in a proper case introduce evidence of those injuries. Diaz v. State, 597 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); cf. Caton v. State, 597 So. 2d 412-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (on facts of that case, allowing inquiry “about fears that defendant would sue [officer] in a civil suit for using excessive force in the incident”). However, the defendant’s right to cross-examine on the question of bias is…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974)
- Auchmuty v. State, 594 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Lavette v. State, 442 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Leamon T. COX v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- O'Neil v. Travelers Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)