RAYMOND JOHNSON, ETC., PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be separately convicted and sentenced for grand theft of cash and grand theft of a firearm when both items are taken from a single purse in one continuous act, even though the defendant was unaware of the purse's contents. The Court clarified that the degree of theft depends on what was taken, but multiple takings in a single act constitute only one theft offense.
No. A defendant may not be separately convicted and sentenced for grand theft of cash and grand theft of a firearm when accomplished by snatching a single purse containing both items in one act. The value of the property and the nature of items taken merely define the degree of the felony but do not constitute separate crimes; separate crimes occur only when there are separate distinct acts of seizing property.
[1] A single act of theft, even if it involves items of different types or values, does not support separate convictions for theft based on each item taken.
[2] The value of stolen property or the fact that a firearm is stolen serves only to define the degree of the felony theft, not to create separate offenses.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that the value of the goods or the taking of a firearm merely defines the degree of the felony and does not constitute separate crimes. A separate crime occurs only when there are separate distinct acts of seizing the property of another.”
Establishes the core holding that multiple items taken in a single act constitute one theft offense, with the degree determined by the items' value and nature.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRaymond Johnson snatched a purse from an unattended car at a gas station in a single swift motion. The purse contained cash, payroll checks, and a fir…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review Johnson v. State, 574 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which certified the following question of great public importance:
WHEN A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION IS ALLEGED BASED ON THE CRIMES OF GRAND THEFT OF PROPERTY (BETWEEN $300 AND $20,000) AND OF A FIREARM IN A SINGLE ACT, AND THE CRIMES OC CURRED AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF SECTION 775.021, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1988), IS IT UNLAWFUL TO CONVICT AND SENTENCE FOR BOTH CRIMES?
Id. at 242. We rephrase the question as follows:
May a defendant be separately convicted and sentenced for grand theft of cash and grand theft of a firearm accomplished by means of snatching a purse that contained both cash and a firearm when the defendant did not know the nature of the purse’s contents?
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the rephrased question in the negative and remand for further proceedings.
Raymond Johnson was convicted and sentenced for the crimes of burglary of a conveyance, grand theft of property (i.e., cash and payroll checks), and grand theft of a firearm. All of these crimes allegedly were committed when Johnson snatched a purse left in an unattended car at a gas station. That purse contained both money and a firearm, among other items. A filling station attendant identified Johnson as the man he had seen near the victim’s car immediately before and after the snatching. An eye witness saw Johnson fleeing the scene.
The theft occurred when Johnson wrongfully took the property of another. He did this in one swift motion. The degree of the crime of theft depends on what was taken. Because of the value of the property, his crime was a third-degree felony. Because part of the goods he took was a firearm, his crime additionally is defined as a third-degree felony. Subsection 812.014(1), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the crime of theft, and subsection 812.014(2) sets the degree of the crime committed under subsection (1). We conclude that the value of the goods or the taking of a firearm merely defines the degree of the felony and does not constitute separate crimes. A separate crime occurs only when there are separate distinct acts of seizing the property of another. We recognize that our views herein appear to be contrary to State v. Getz, 435 So. 2d 789 (Fla.1983), wherein we upheld a third-degree felony conviction for the taking of a gun and a petit theft conviction for the taking of a calculator when both takings occurred during a household burglary. In Getz, however, there was a separate intent and act to take each item. In this case there was one intent and one act of taking the handbag. Had the gun been picked up separately from the taking of the handbag, Getz would allow separate convictions. However, neither Getz nor Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla.1984) (where five firearms were knowingly taken), should apply where an enclosed bag and its contents are the subject of the theft in one swift action. Accordingly, there could be only one theft conviction in this case.
Finally, we reject the other issues raised by the petitioner. While some of the evidence against Johnson unquestionably was circumstantial, there also is a significant amount of direct evidence against him in the form of testimony by an eye witness. This is sufficient to support the fact-finder’s conclusion that Johnson’s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We also believe that the victim’s testimony that she had not received any reimbursement for the property stolen from her, if error, was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt in light of the totality of this record. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986). The opinion below is quashed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed above.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, barkett, grimes, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
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Eli Enrique Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009)…s Court relied on earlier decisions in which it found that dual convictions for other crimes that were also aggravated forms of theft violated double jeopardy. See id. at 153-54 (citing State v. Thompson, 607 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1992); Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 798 (Fla.1992)). Three years later, in State v. Anderson, 695 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1997), this Court held that the prohibition against double jeopardy was violated where the defendant was charged and convicted of both committing perjury in an official proce…
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Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1994)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Sirmons v. State, 603 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with our decisions in Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 798 (Fla.1992), and State v. Thompson, 607 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1992). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Jesse Sirmons was convicted of grand theft of an automobile1 and robbery with a weapon.2 The convictions arose from a single taking o…1 / 2
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Bryon Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2001)…tory exceptions, however, is more complex. At issue in the present case is the construction of the second exception — offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.3 We addressed varying degrees of crimes in Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 798 (Fla.1992). In that case, the defendant was convicted of both grand theft of property and grand theft of a firearm for snatching a purse containing both cash and a firearm. See id. at 799. We concluded that the value of the goods or the taking of a…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Smith v. State, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Getz, 435 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1983)
- Johnson v. State, 574 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Dep't OF Mil. Affairs v. Dep't OF Admin., 574 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)