KENNETH L. MAEWEATHER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kenneth Maeweather appealed his conviction and sentence as a habitual violent felony offender on three grounds. The court affirmed his conviction while certifying two questions of great public importance regarding the constitutionality of Florida's habitual violent felony offender statute.
The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The first point regarding witness testimony was affirmed without discussion. The court rejected the double jeopardy argument based on precedent. The court rejected all constitutional challenges to the habitual violent felony offender statute, relying on established precedent from multiple prior cases.
[1] A prior felony conviction may be used as the basis for a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and for classification as a habitual violent felony offend…
[2] The Florida habitual violent felony offender statute is constitutional and does not violate equal protection, due process, or double jeopardy provisions.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Whether the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Florida constitutions were violated by the trial court's use of the same prior conviction as the basis for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and for classification of the appellant as a habitual violent felony offender.”
The certified question of great public importance regarding whether using the same prior conviction for two purposes violates double jeopardy protections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKenneth Maeweather was convicted as a habitual violent felony offender. The trial court used the same prior felony conviction both as the basis for co…
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PER CURIAM.
Appealing his conviction and sentence as a habitual violent felony offender, Kenneth Maeweather raises three points.
Appellant’s first point, based on error in allowing the witness Ramirez to testify, is affirmed without discussion. Appellant’s second point urges that the circuit court’s use of the same prior felony conviction to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to sentence him to an extended term as a habitual violent felony offender violates the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. We reject this argument on the authority of Gayman v. State, 584 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). As in that case, we certify the following question of great public importance:
Whether the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Florida constitutions were violated by the trial court’s use of the same prior conviction as the basis for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and for classification of the appellant as a habitual violent felony offender. Appellant’s third point contends that the Florida habitual violent felony offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), is unconstitutional on the grounds that: (1) it is inequitable, irrational, vague and subject to arbitrary and capricious application; (2) it violates the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws; and (3) it fails the due process test of “a reasonable and substantial relationship to the objects sought to be obtained” because it does not punish for repetition of violent crimes, but for only one violent crime. Each of these arguments has been decided adversely to appellant's contention. Tillman v. State, 586 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (the habitual violent felony offender statute does not violate equal protection rights, due process rights, or double jeopardy provisions); Perkins v. State, 583 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA), jurisdiction accepted, 590 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1991) (the 1989 habitual violent felony offender statute does not violate constitutional rights concerning due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto laws); Ross v. State, 579 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA), jurisdiction accepted, 589 So. 2d 292 (Fla.1991) (rejecting the arguments that the 1988 habitual violent felony offender statute violates substantive due process rights by classifying an individual as a habitual violent felon where the present offense is a nonviolent offense, and that this statute does not serve a legitimate state interest by utilizing a means reasonably related to achieve the intended purpose); Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1991) (section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), does not violate equal protection, and is not inequitable, irrational, vague and subject to arbitrary and capricious application). See also Henderson v. State, 569 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). As in Tillman, we certify the following questions of great public importance:
1. Does it violate a defendant’s substantive due process rights when he is classified as a violent felony offender pursuant to section 775.084 and thereby subjected to an extended term of imprisonment, if he has been convicted of an enumerated violent felony within the previous five years, even though his present offense is a nonviolent felony?
2. Does section 775.084(l)(b) violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by increasing a defendant’s punishment due to the nature of the pri-or offense?
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, ZEHMER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
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Maeweather v. State, 616 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1993)…OVERTON, Justice. We have for review Maeweather v. State, 599 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court upheld Maeweather’s conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and his sentencing as a habitual offender. In upholding Maew-eather’s conviction and sentence, the district court certifi…
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Edler v. State, 616 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…he prior offenses used for habitualization were also used to prove a past conviction, an element of the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The double jeopardy argument raised by appellant has been rejected. Maeweather v. State, 599 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), affirmed, 616 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1993). Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to read, in the second trial, the testimony given by a witness to the shooting, Chris Sanders, in the first trial…
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Mason v. State, 645 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…under the impression that if she sentenced Mason as a violent offender on the robberies, a life sentence would be required. As the state points out, a violent offender sentence is proper when sentencing on a nonviolent offense, Maeweather v. State, 599 So. 2d 733 (Fla 1st DCA 1992) (felon in possession of a firearm), approved, 616 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1993), and a life sentence is not required when a violent offender sentence is imposed for a first-degree felony. Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992). The…
Authorities Cited
- Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Isaiah Perkins v. State, 583 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Leshawn Tillman v. State, 586 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Henderson v. State, 569 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Ross v. State, 579 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Dorcy Gayman v. State, 584 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)