DOUGLAS G. DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine found from a search of his person after his arrest for trespass. The search was valid as having been incident to a lawful arrest. See Moreland v. State, 552 So. 2d 937, 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), review denied, 562 So. 2d 346 (1990). An arrest need only be supported by probable cause, see, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, 833 (1979), not necessarily a prima facie case. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 (1969) (“nly the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause....”) (quoted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 546 (1983)).
Affirmed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and BLUE, JJ., concur.
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Knowles v. State, 41 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…the defendant’s judgment and sentence become final. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). The two-year time period begins to run when appellate proceedings have concluded and the court issues a mandate, a fact clearly stated in the Rule. See Jones v. State, 602 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Although the Rule lists three exceptions to its timeliness requirement, it indicates the exceptions must be alleged in the postconviction motion to be considered. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(l — 3). Here, the appellate p…
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- Illinois v. Gates et ux., 462 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1983)
- Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (U.S. 1969)
- Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1979)
- Moreland v. State, 552 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)