DAVID TROY KNOWLES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Troy Knowles appealed the trial court's denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction motion. The court affirmed the denial on timeliness grounds, finding the motion was filed nearly 19 years after appellate proceedings concluded, far exceeding the two-year deadline, and recommended disciplinary sanctions against Knowles for filing a frivolous appeal.
The motion was properly denied as clearly untimely. A Rule 3.850 motion must be filed within two years after the judgment and sentence become final, and Knowles' motion was filed nearly 19 years after that deadline without alleging any applicable exceptions. The appeal was frivolous.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850 must be filed within two years after the defendant's judgment and sentence become final.
[2] The two-year time period for filing a Rule 3.850 motion begins to run when appellate proceedings have concluded and the court issues a mandate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A Rule 3.850 motion must be filed within two years after the defendant's judgment and sentence become final.”
Establishes the strict two-year filing deadline for postconviction motions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKnowles filed a Rule 3.850 postconviction motion nearly 19 years after this Court affirmed his conviction and appellate proceedings concluded. He prov…
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Appellant challenges the denial of his postconviction motion brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (2010). Without reaching the merits of the motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial as the motion was clearly untimely.
A Rule 3.850 motion must be filed within two years after the defendant’s judgment and sentence become final. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). The two-year time period begins to run when appellate proceedings have concluded and the court issues a mandate, a fact clearly stated in the Rule. See Jones v. State, 602 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Although the Rule lists three exceptions to its timeliness requirement, it indicates the exceptions must be alleged in the postconviction motion to be considered. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(l — 3).
Here, the appellate proceedings in Appellant’s case concluded nearly 19 years ago when this Court affirmed his conviction. Despite this fact, Appellant proceeded to file the instant motion, giving no reason for his tardiness and failing to allege any of the exceptions listed in Rule 3.850(b)(l-3). When the trial court denied the action as time barred, Appellant ignored its reasoning and filed the instant appeal. Such action, which shows a lack of respect for court procedure and an indifference to the law, has resulted in court time and resources being spent on an appeal whose baseless nature was plain from the start. See Proctor v. State, 869 So.2d 752, 753 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), quoting United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2001) (“ ‘having to file, read, and return a frivolous motion is almost as great a burden on the court’s staff as the preparation of a ruling’ ”). Considering that the motion was clearly time barred, and considering that this fact was made known to Appellant prior to the filing of this appeal, we find Appellant’s appeal to be frivolous.
For this reason, we not only affirm the denial of Appellant’s 3.850 motion, but also recommend that the Department of Corrections impose disciplinary sanctions, including, if appropriate, the loss of gain *334time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009) (stating that when an inmate files a “frivolous or malicious collateral criminal proceeding,” a court may recommend “disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections”); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009) (authorizing the Department of Corrections to forfeit gain time when an inmate files a “frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal”). Pursuant to section 944.279, we direct the Clerk of this court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate correctional facility for the consideration of disciplinary procedures against Appellant.
AFFIRMED; Certified Opinion FORWARDED to the Department of Corrections.
KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ, concur.
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Christan Starkes v. State, 231 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (establishing two-year deadline). But because Starkes appealed the two convictions (see Case No. 1D13-4795), the clock did not start running until this court affirmed and the mandate issued in March 2015. See Knowles v. State, 41 So. 3d 332, 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Thus, Starkes’s rule 3.850 motions were timely filed in 2016. We therefore reverse and remand so that the trial court can address the motions on their merits.* REVERSED and REMANDED. B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and OSTERHAUS an…
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Authorities Cited
- Proctor v. State, 869 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Jones v. State, 602 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Davis v. State, 602 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)