MARCIA KUCZWANSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN S. KUCZWANSKI, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of enhanced alimony but reversed its refusal to award the wife reasonable attorney's fees and costs, finding the significant income disparity between the parties ($330,000 to $48,000 annually) warranted an award to equalize the parties' ability to secure legal counsel.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying enhanced alimony because the wife failed to demonstrate that her needs had increased or were unmet when the marital settlement agreement was entered. However, the trial court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs given the significant disparity in the parties' financial abilities.
[1] A party seeking to modify an alimony award must demonstrate that their needs have not been met or have increased since the entry of the marital settlement agreement.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a party reasonable attorney's fees and costs in a domestic case when there is a significant disparity in the parties' finan…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the enhanced finances of John Kuczwanski (husband) were insufficient to require augmented alimony for the wife. The wife failed to show that her needs had not been met when the marital settlement agreement was entered into or that her needs have since increased.”
Establishes the standard for modification of alimony in Florida—requiring proof of changed circumstances regarding needs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarcia Kuczwanski appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, seeking modification of alimony and an award of attorney's fees and costs. The…
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PER CURIAM.
Marcia Kuczwanski (wife) appeals both the trial court’s denial of her supplemental petition to modify the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and her request for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the trial court, except for its denial of fees and costs.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the enhanced finances of John Kuczwanski (husband) were insufficient to require augmented alimony for the wife. The wife failed to show that her needs had not been met when the marital settlement agreement was entered into or that her needs have since increased. See Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla.1991).
We disagree, however, with the trial court’s denial of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the wife. One of the main principles on which fees are permitted in domestic cases is to equalize the otherwise disparate financial abilities of the parties to secure competent legal counsel. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980). In light of the disparity in the parties’ annual incomes (approximately $330,000.00 for the husband and approximately $48,000.00 for the wife), the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1991); Zakarin v. Zakarin, 565 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Johns v. Johns, 423 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of increased alimony, but reverse the trial court’s denial of fees and costs. On remand, the trial court shall determine and award the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
GUNTHER, J., and ALDERMAN, JAMES E., Senior Justice, concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissenting with opinion.
ANSTEAD, Judge,
dissenting.
I would remand for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bedell. The trial court expressly relied on the district court’s opinion in Bedell, which was overturned by the Supreme Court. In addition, the trial court made an express finding suggesting that the wife had waived her right to seek a modification of alimony based upon the parties’ anticipation that the husband would increase his earnings in the future. This finding, in my view, was also erroneous. The removal of these two substantial predicates for the trial court’s ruling at least raises a question as to whether the ruling would have been the same absent these considerations.
While it is entirely possible that the trial court could reach the same result, I do not believe it is fair for us to conclusively presume so by our affirmance.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Campbell v. Dina M. Campbell, 46 So. 3d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…spects, except that portion that awards attorney’s fees to counsel for Ap-pellee, Dina M. Campbell (Wife). A trial judge’s award of attorney’s fees and costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623, 623-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The standard for awarding attorney’s fees in dissolution cases is the financial need of the requesting party and the financial ability of the other party to pay. Derrevere v. Derrevere, 899 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 4th DC…
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Margulies v. Margulies, 645 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…ablished annual income from his medical practice, he should be required to pay all of the wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1993); see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980); Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Sloman v. Sloman, 418 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We do not, however, quarrel with the amount of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs which the trial court determined to be reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse t…
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Oldham v. Oldham, 683 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…1991); Dykes v. Dykes, 475 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Where one party has a greatly superior income producing ability and assets, an award of attorney’s fees to the less financially secure spouse is appropriate. E.g., Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. [4th DCA] 1980 [1992]); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980). To set a reasonable fee in a domestic case, a court must use the methodology outlined in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Diane v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991)
- Bette Johns v. Johns, 423 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Zakarin v. Zakarin, 565 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)