KAREN MARGULIES, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
STANLEY MARGULIES, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife, holding that the husband's substantially superior financial position required him to pay all of the wife's reasonable attorney's fees and costs rather than just half. The court affirmed other aspects of the divorce judgment.
The court held that the husband should be required to pay all of the wife's reasonable attorney's fees and costs, not just half, because his substantially superior financial position from his established medical practice income enabled him to pay the fees from current earned income without invading assets, whereas the wife would need to invade her capital assets to pay her portion.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering a spouse with significantly inferior financial resources to pay half of the other spouse's attorney's fees and costs when…
[2] In dissolution of marriage proceedings, a spouse's ability to pay attorney's fees and costs from current earned income without invading assets is a critical factor in det…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because of the husband's substantially superior financial position as a result of his established annual income from his medical practice, he should be required to pay all of the wife's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.”
Establishes the primary holding that the husband must pay all attorney's fees based on his superior earning capacity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter thirty-one years of marriage, a medical doctor (husband) and his non-employed wife (age 55) divorced. The husband earned approximately $550,000 …
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PARIENTE, Judge.
This is an appeal by the wife from a dissolution of marriage judgment and husband’s cross-appeal. Among the several points raised on appeal and cross-appeal, only the attorney’s fees award warrants discussion and reversal.
After thirty-one years of marriage, the parties divorced. The husband is a medical doctor and chief of radiology of a hospital. The wife had not been gainfully employed during the marriage and was fifty-five years of age at the time of trial. The trial court found that the wife had no readily marketable skills which would enable her to establish a standard of living commensurate with the standard set throughout the marriage. The husband’s stipulated annual income from his medical practice averaged $550,000, exclusive of income from other assets.
While the parties’ assets were equitably distributed so that the wife would receive income from their investments, together with permanent periodic alimony, in light of the substantial disparity in actual income and earning capacity between the parties, the trial court improperly determined that the husband should only pay one-half of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs. In order to pay for her attorney’s fees and costs, the wife would be required to invade her capital assets, which in turn would decrease the amount of income which they would generate. On the other hand, the husband could pay for all of the fees and' costs out of current earned income, without invading any assets or even touching his investment income. Because of the husband’s substantially superior financial position as a result of his established annual income from his medical practice, he should be required to pay all of the wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1993); see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980); Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Sloman v. Sloman, 418 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
We do not, however, quarrel with the amount of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs which the trial court determined to be reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of one-half of the fees and costs and remand with instructions to award the wife the full amount of attorney’s fees and costs which the trial court determined to be reasonable.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…making the partial award to the former wife erroneous and reversible. We recognize that there are cases where, despite equalized assets, one spouse’s vastly superior income makes an award to the other spouse appropriate. See Margulies v. Margulies, 645 So. 2d 54, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, in this case the former wife’s assets substantially exceed the former husband’s, pulling them into parity despite his greater income. See Smith v. Smith, 737 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that the tri…
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Nicolaus von Baillou v. von Baillou, 959 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…itable diminution” of a spouse’s share of an equitable distribution. Bagley, 720 So. 2d at 583-84; see Hough v. Hough, 739 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Kendall v. Kendall, 677 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); [*824] Margulies v. Margulies, 645 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). What amounts to an “inequitable diminution” of a share of equitable distribution is a fact-sensitive determination. In cases where the “poorer” spouse left the marriage with a substantial equitable distribution, courts have eit…
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Wofford v. Wofford, 20 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…o pay. We likewise reverse the order denying the wife attorney’s fees. The court’s final judgment clearly shows that the husband has a superior ability to pay, and the wife has a need of funds to pay her attorney’s fees. See Margulies v. Margulies, 645 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Finally, it is somewhat inexplicable that, at a time when the home mortgage was pending foreclosure, the trial court found it appropriate to relieve the husband of his contemptuous conduct in failing to pay the household bills…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Adelaide v. Sloman, 418 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)