FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A CORPORATE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT,
v.
RONALD S. MOLKO, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
FHLMC sued to foreclose mortgages held by Molko and obtained a settlement agreement requiring Molko to sell properties and make monthly interim payments. The trial court denied FHLMC's motions to enforce the agreement when Molko failed to make a November interim payment, but the appellate court reversed, holding the settlement agreement unambiguously required the payment.
The settlement agreement unambiguously required the November interim payment because it expressly called for payment for 'the month in which the sale of the Mortgaged Properties is closed.' The trial court erred in denying FHLMC's motions to enforce the agreement.
[1] Settlement agreements are governed by the rules for interpretation of contracts.
[2] The clear expression of the meaning of a contract may not be modified by court interpretation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Settlement agreements 'are governed by the rules for interpretation of contracts.'”
Establishes that settlement agreements are interpreted under contract interpretation law, not special settlement agreement rules.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFHLMC and Molko executed a settlement agreement in a foreclosure action requiring Molko to sell two mortgaged properties by December 1991, pay off the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Enforce cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation [FHLMC] appeals orders denying its motions to enforce a settlement agreement. We reverse.
FHLMC sued to foreclose two mortgages Ronald S. Molko held on two properties. Before trial, FHLMC and Molko executed a settlement agreement. Molko agreed to sell the properties by December 1991, to pay off the mortgages, and to remit monthly interim payments.1 The court approved the agreement, and reserved jurisdiction to enforce the agreement’s terms. The sale closed on November 6, 1991; Molko did not remit the November interim payment. FHLMC filed motions to enforce the agreement, seeking orders requiring Molko to make the November interim payment. The trial court entered orders denying the motions.
We reverse the orders. We hold that the settlement agreement unambiguously required the November interim payment. Settlement agreements “are governed by the rules for interpretation of contracts.” Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985). The clear expression of the meaning of a contract may not be modified by court interpretation, Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 52 So. 2d 910 (Fla.1951); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1986); “[i]f the terms are clear and unambiguous, the express terms control.” Avery Dev. Co. v. Bast, 582 So. 2d 150, 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The settlement agreement called for the November interim payment. Payment was due for the “month in which the sale of the Mortgaged Properties is closed.... The trial court should have enforced the agreement. We hold that it erred in denying FHLMC’s motions.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. The agreement states as follows:
3. Interim Payments. Between and including July 1, 1991 and the first day of the month in which the sale of the Mortgaged Properties is closed, Molko shall pay to FHLMC the sum of ⅞31,975.20 per month. Each such interim payment shall be due, owing and payable on the seventh day of each month, beginning July 7, 1991....
(emphasis supplied).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Walgreen Co. v. Habitat Dev. Corp., 655 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…e language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed to mean “just what the language therein implies and nothing more.” Camichos v. Diana Stores Corp., 157 Fla. 349, 25 So. 2d 864, 870 (1946); see also Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Molko, 602 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1986). In the instant case, the trial court found that the phrase “in a safe condition and reasonably good order and repair” re…
-
BAC Int'l Credit Corp. v. MacIa, 626 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…ents are highly favored and will be enforced whenever possible.” Robbie v. City of Miami 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985) (citations omitted). The terms of the settlement here are clear and unambiguous. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Molko, 602 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The lender had agreed to forbear from proceeding with its pending foreclosure action, so long as payments were made in accordance with the specifically agreed schedule. In our view the settlement should have been enforced in acco…
-
Lentz v. Cmty. Bank OF Fla., Inc., 189 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…court’s factual findings resulting from its weighing of testimony adduced at this hearing. The relevant provisions of the MSA are unambiguous, however^ and therefore, may not be modified by court interpretation. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Molko, 602 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (Mem). Parol evidence should not have been used to vary the unambiguous terms of the MSA. See Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 52-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robbie v. City OF Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1985)
- BMW OF N. Am., Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Ind., 52 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1951)
- Viqueira v. State, 582 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)