ZIVADIN S. KRSTIC, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
GIANNA MILITO KRSTIC, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenged the trial court's orders regarding housing assistance, alimony, and asset distribution. The appellate court affirmed the reservation of jurisdiction for potential post-secondary education support but reversed and remanded the cosigning requirement, lump sum alimony award, and asset distribution due to calculation discrepancies.
The court reversed the cosigning requirement because no basis existed for that open-ended form of relief, reversed the lump sum alimony and asset distribution awards due to calculation discrepancies requiring recalculation, and affirmed the reservation of jurisdiction for potential post-secondary education support as it merely preserved future options if the law changed.
[1] A trial court may not order open-ended financial relief to a party in a dissolution of marriage judgment without a clear basis in law.
[2] A trial court may reserve jurisdiction to order post-secondary educational support for children if the law changes to permit such relief.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the equitable relief granted to wife in this provision may have been intended as an incident of child support, we can find no basis for this particular open-ended form of relief.”
Establishes that while housing assistance for custodial parent may be appropriate, the specific mechanism of requiring husband to cosign with indemnification lacks legal foundation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court awarded the wife primary residential custody of the children and ordered the husband to cosign or collateralize a note and mortgage to…
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PER CURIAM.
The husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
In the final judgment, the trial court ordered the husband to cosign or collateralize a note and mortgage to enable the wife, who was awarded primary residential custody of the children, to purchase a residence. In exchange, the wife was to hold the husband harmless on the obligation. Although the equitable relief granted to wife in this provision may have been intended as an incident of child support, we can find no basis for this particular open-ended form of relief. Compare Powell v. Powell, 580 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (trial court awarded wife marital home and ordered wife to pay mortgage obligation, while not ordering wife to hold husband harmless; on husband’s appeal, court held that indemnification as between parties was matter within court’s discretion regarding distribution of assets).
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment and remand with directions to consider other alternatives that would both ensure adequate housing for the children during their minority and apprise the husband of the financial extent and duration of his obligation.
We also reverse the award of lump sum alimony and the distribution of the sole marital asset — the appreciation in the value of the nonmarital assets.
The record indicates that the award resulting from the calculations employed in the final judgment differs from the award made by the trial court in its oral pronouncements at the final hearing.
Accordingly, we remand for recalculation of the amounts that the husband must pay to the wife as equitable distribution and as lump sum alimony. See Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (trial court erred in failing to conform final judgment to oral pronouncements regarding child support and visitation rights). We find no error in that portion of the order by which the trial court reserved jurisdiction to order the husband to provide for the children’s post-secondary education should that relief become available under Florida law. The reservation of jurisdiction does not run afoul of Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1984) (trial court may not order post-majority support simply because child is in college and divorced parent can afford to pay).
The order simply left open the possibility that should the law change, such relief may be available to the children.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.
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Leonard v. Leonard, 613 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…ial judge reflected a value of $50,000 less, causing a loss to the wife of $25,000. The final judgment as to the value of the husband’s pension plan does not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement and must be reversed. See Krstic v. Krstic, 604 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), review denied, 604 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1992). Finally, we find the trial court erred in awarding the wife an inadequate amount of alimony, and in denying the wife’s motion for…
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Ofelia de Armas v. de Armas, 639 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…The inconsistencies in the oral pronouncement and the conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment concerning the marital home mandate clarification.1 See Leonard v. Leonard, 613 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Krstic v. Krstic, 604 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The next irregularity is the court’s award to the husband of approximately 63% of the marital assets without explaining the basis for its inequitable distribution. Section 61.-075(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), requires the tri…
Authorities Cited
- Grapin v. Bertram Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984)
- Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Powell v. Powell, 580 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)