VERNON CREAMER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Vernon Creamer appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that knowledge of possession was a required element. The court agrees and reverses, holding that knowledge is an essential element of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Knowledge of possession is an element of the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on this element constitutes reversible error when the issue is properly preserved by objection. The conviction and sentence are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
[1] Knowledge of possession is an element of the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
[2] A trial court errs in refusing to instruct the jury on the element of knowledge for the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when the issue is properly p…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[j]ust as in cases involving the possession of drugs, in order to prove possession of a firearm, there must be evidence to support a finding that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the gun and the ability to exercise control over it.”
Establishes that knowledge is a required element of firearm possession, paralleling the law on drug possession.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVernon Creamer was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that Creamer must have 'kno…
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ALLEN, Judge.
Vernon Creamer appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues that the trial court reversibly erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, before they could find him guilty, they were required to find that he “knowingly” possessed the firearm. We agree and reverse.
In Wilcox v. State, 522 So. 2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), the court held that “[j]ust as in cases involving the possession of drugs, in order to prove possession of a firearm, there must be evidence to support a finding that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the gun and the ability to exercise control over it.” Similarly, in White v. State, 539 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), the Fifth District held that the trial court’s failure to instruct on knowledge was reversible error. That court said, “[t]he standard instruction permits conviction without any culpable mental state, contrary to established Florida law.” Id. at 579.
Although the standard jury instruction was amended shortly thereafter, the amendment did not cure the deficiency because the instruction still did not include knowledge as an element of the offense. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla.1989). Just recently, however, the supreme court approved an amendment to those instructions so that they now read:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of (crime charged), the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Defendant) had been convicted of (prior offense).
2. After the conviction (defendant) knowingly
a. [owned] [had in [his] [her] care, custody, possession or control]
[a firearm.]
[an electric weapon or device.]
Standard Jury Instructions — Criminal Cases No. 92-1, 603 So. 2d 1175 (Fla.1992). The explanation for the amendment reads as follows: “This change (addition of “knowingly” in paragraph (2)) is based on White v. State, 539 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).” Id. at 1221.
In State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1991), the court held that a jury instruction omitting an element of the crime that was not disputed in the case does not constitute fundamental error that may be raised on appeal in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. Id. at 645. In the case before us, however, the issue was properly preserved by objection.
It is clear, therefore, that knowledge of possession is an element of the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and it is also clear that the trial court in this case erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to this element. Because this error was preserved by a proper objection and is not harmless, Creamer is entitled to a new trial.
Although this disposition renders moot Creamer’s remaining points, we briefly address those issues that may be relevant on remand. Creamer claims the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction on flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. In the recent case of Fenelon v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla.1992), the supreme court held that the flight instruction would henceforth not be given in criminal cases, and thus, the trial court should refrain from giving the flight instruction on remand. In addition, the state concedes that this case falls under the dictates of Johnson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding section 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1989), as amended, violates single subject rule). Accordingly, Creamer cannot be classified a habitual violent felony offender on remand. The conviction and sentence are reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
BOOTH and SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Garmon v. State, 772 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ove a prima facie corpus delicti of such a crime the state was obligated to prove Garmon was a convicted felon (which was stipulated to) and that he knowingly owned or had a firearm in his care, custody, possession, or control. See Creamer v. State, 605 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The state independently proved at trial that Garmon owned the Ford truck and that it contained a hidden “kill switch” which had to be disarmed before the vehicle could be started. In addition, there were Garmon’s self-incr…
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A. P. v. State, 250 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…(citations omitted). Similarly, to prove constructive possession of a firearm the State must produce evidence establishing that "the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the gun and the ability to exercise control over it." Creamer v. State, 605 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (quoting Wilcox v. State, 522 So. 2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA - 5 - 1988)). In a car that is jointly occupied, knowledge and the ability to control the firearm may not be inferred but must be established by independent proo…
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Johnson v. State, 890 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…ssession is an element of the crime of which Johnson was convicted, and the jury should have been instructed that it had to find he had knowledge of any firearm it found he possessed, and an ability to exercise control over it. See Creamer v. State, 605 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); White v. State, 539 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). That element has been included in the standard jury instruction since 1992. See Creamer, 605 So. 2d at 542. If the jury was not so instructed, counsel should have objected. Th…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- D'Angelo v. State, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Batraville Vincent Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- King Anthony Green v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992)
- STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL CASES NO. 92-1, 603 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992)
- In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1989)
- Johnson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Clevent D. Wilcox v. State, 522 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Felton White v. State, 539 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- State v. Martin, 539 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)