ELIZABETH NICOLITZ, PETITIONER,
v.
BOARD OF OPTICIANRY AND DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, RESPONDENTS
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Nicolitz, a licensed optician facing an administrative complaint, sought a formal hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. After the hearing officer denied the Department's motion to relinquish jurisdiction, the Department filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, attempting to proceed informally before the Board. The court granted Nicolitz's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that once a case is referred to DOAH, the agency cannot revest jurisdiction in itself without a recommended order from the hearing officer.
Once a referral to DOAH is made, the referring agency becomes bound as a party litigant and can only revest jurisdiction in itself by obtaining a favorable ruling on a motion to relinquish jurisdiction. When such a motion is denied, the agency must either proceed to formal hearing or discontinue prosecution; it cannot thereafter withdraw the complaint and proceed informally before the Board.
[1] Once an administrative matter is referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for a formal hearing, the referring agency may only act as a party litigant an…
[2] An agency that moves to relinquish jurisdiction from DOAH and is denied must proceed to a formal hearing or discontinue prosecution.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a referral to DOAH is made, however, "the referring agency shall take no action with respect to the formal proceeding except as a party litigant." § 120.57(1)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).”
Establishes the fundamental constraint on agency action after referring a matter to DOAH
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNicolitz, a licensed optician on probation, filed two late quarterly reports, prompting an administrative complaint. She elected to dispute the allega…
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PER CURIAM.
The petition of respondent, Board of Op-ticianry, for rehearing or clarification is granted, and the following opinion is substituted for the opinion originally issued in this cause.
Elizabeth Nicolitz, a licensed optician, seeks a writ of prohibition to preclude further proceedings against her on an administrative complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the petition.
Nicolitz was previously placed on probation and ordered to file quarterly reports. When two of those reports were late, an administrative complaint was filed against her. Through counsel she executed an “election of rights” form and disputed the allegations of fact and sought a formal hearing before a Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) hearing officer in accordance with section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The matter was referred to DOAH, where counsel for the Department of Professional Regulation (department) and counsel for Nicolitz entered into a prehear-ing stipulation. The department construed this stipulation as demonstrating an absence of disputed issues of material fact and, in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.033, moved the hearing officer to relinquish jurisdiction. The DOAH hearing officer considered Nicolitz’s response in opposition to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction, heard oral argument, and denied the motion.
Several weeks later, and one day before the scheduled formal hearing, counsel for the department filed a “notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice.” This pleading essentially tracked the earlier motion to relinquish jurisdiction in alleging that no material issues of fact were in dispute, and sought dismissal without prejudice to the department’s right to proceed before the Board of Opticianry (board) in an informal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. The hearing officer entered an order which “ratified” the voluntary dismissal and purported to dismiss the administrative complaint. See Fla.Admin.Code Rule 221-6.037. When an informal hearing was scheduled before the board, Nicolitz petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition and we issued an order to show cause. We have considered the petition, the responses of the department and the board, and petitioner’s reply, and we grant relief.
When a party seeks a formal hearing in accordance with section 120.- 57(1), an agency may conclude that no dispute of material fact has been demonstrated, refuse to refer the matter to DOAH, and proceed informally. If the agency’s decision regarding the need for formal proceedings was incorrect, the error can be corrected on appeal from final order. Tuckman v. Florida State University, 489 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Once a referral to DOAH is made, however, “the referring agency shall take no action with respect to the formal proceeding except as a party litigant.” § 120.57(1)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).
Here, the department could only revest jurisdiction in the board without a recommended order from the hearing officer by obtaining a favorable ruling on its rule 221-6.033 motion. When the motion was opposed and denied, the department was bound to proceed to formal hearing or discontinue prosecution pursuant to section 455.225(2), Florida Statutes (1991).
The department chose the latter option.1 Since the complaint was dismissed, the board was and is without jurisdiction to proceed against the petitioner by way of an informal proceeding.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted.
MINER, WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . If the probable cause panel of the board had wished to continue the prosecution, it could have done so pursuant to § 455.225(4), Fla.Stat. Upon entrance into the proceeding, however, the board is subject to the same constraints as the department once it becomes a party and may only pursue prosecution by way of the formal administrative proceeding, absent an agreement from the respondent. § 120.-57(l)(b)(3), Fla.Stat. (1991).
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Schafer v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., 844 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…s are not in dispute, an agency need not refer a matter to the Department of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing, even if such a hearing is requested by a party. It may, instead, proceed informally. See, e.g., Nicolitz v. Bd. of Opticianry, 609 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Village Saloon, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 463 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (on denial of rehearing). Appellant was charged with a violation of section 489.533(l)(m)4,…
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Meller v. Fla. Real Est. Comm'n, 902 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…are not in dispute, an agency need not refer a matter to the Department of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing, even if such a hearing is requested by a party. It may, instead, proceed informally.”) (citing Nicolitz v. Board of Opticianry, 609 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Village Saloon). . We are aware of this court's decision in McIntyre v. Seminole County School Board, 779 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), indicating that a formal hearing must be requested or it is waived. This has not b…
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Gonzalez v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., 958 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…are not in dispute, an agency need not refer a matter to the Department of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing, even if such a hearing is requested by a party. It may, instead, proceed informally.” Id. (citing Nicolitz v. Bd. of Opticianry, 609 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)). Here, the Appellant was charged with violating section 489.129(l)(q), which authorizes the Board to revoke a license when the licensee “fail[s] to satisfy within a reasonable time, the terms of a civil judgment obtained…
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- Darin Collins v. State, 489 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)