JOSE R. GONZALEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2007-05-30
No. 3D06-1477
Before RAMIREZ, CORTIÑAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
958 So. 2d 494 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2007) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jose Gonzalez appeals the Department of Business and Professional Regulation's revocation of his air conditioning contractor's license for failing to satisfy a civil judgment within a reasonable time. The court affirms the revocation, holding that the Board properly proceeded with an informal hearing because no material facts were in dispute.


Holding

The Board properly conducted an informal hearing because no material facts were in dispute, even though the appellant requested a formal hearing. License revocation was an appropriate penalty within the permissible range for the violation.


Headnotes

[1] An agency may proceed with an informal hearing when material facts are not in dispute, even if a formal hearing is requested.

[2] Failure to satisfy a civil judgment related to the practice of a profession within ninety days of its entry, if not appealed, constitutes grounds for license revocation.

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Key Quotes

“When material facts are not in dispute, an agency need not refer a matter to the Department of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing, even if such a hearing is requested by a party. It may, instead, proceed informally.”

Establishes the legal standard for when an agency can proceed informally despite a party's request for formal hearing

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Facts & Procedural History

In August 2004, a default judgment of $17,973.49 was entered against Gonzalez for failure to pay for materials and supplies in his air conditioning co…

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Opinion of the Court
CORTIÑAS, Judge.

CORTIÑAS, Judge.

The Appellant, Jose Gonzalez, seeks review of a final order from the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, revoking his air conditioning contractor’s license. We affirm.

In August 2004, a default judgment in the amount of $17,973.49 was entered against the Appellant for failure to pay for materials and supplies in connection with his practice of air conditioning contracting. Subsequently, in August 2005, the Construction Industry Licensing Board (“Board”) filed an administrative complaint against the Appellant, pursuant to section 489.129(l)(q), Florida Statutes (2005), for failure to satisfy the judgment. In response, the Appellant filed an Election of Rights Form requesting a formal hearing and alleging the existence of disputed material facts. However, the Board concluded that there were no material facts in dispute and, thus, denied the Appellant’s request for a formal hearing.

Thereafter, the Board conducted an informal hearing on the Appellant’s case. At the hearing, the prosecutor presented evidence that the Appellant had four prior section 489.129 violations over a twenty-year span, including violations involving fraud, deceit, or untrue misrepresentations, and assisting in unlicensed activity. The Appellant presented evidence that, on the day before the hearing, he satisfied the judgment at issue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board agreed to fine the Appellant $5,258.35 and revoke his license.1

In its final order, the Board erroneously stated that the Appellant failed to return an Election of Rights Form and, therefore, waived his right to a formal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2005).2 Although the Board erred in that respect, their findings are affirmed as there were no material facts in dispute requiring the Board to conduct a formal hearing. See Schafer v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 844 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)(finding that the Board’s erroneous statement m its final order that the appellant requested an informal, rather than a formal hearing, was harmless because the absence of a disputed material fact allowed the Board to proceed informally).

“When material facts are not in dispute, an agency need not refer a matter to the Department of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing, even if such a hearing is requested by a party. It may, instead, proceed informally.” Id. (citing Nicolitz v. Bd. of Opticianry, 609 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)). Here, the Appellant was charged with violating section 489.129(l)(q), which authorizes the Board to revoke a license when the licensee “fail[s] to satisfy within a reasonable time, the terms of a civil judgment obtained against the licensee, or the business organization qualified by the licensee, relating to the practice of the licensee’s profession.” The language “a reasonable time” is defined in rule 61G4-17.001(l)(q) of the Florida Administrative Code (2005), as “ninety (90) days following the entry of a civil judgment that is not appealed.” The undisputed facts show that the Appellant never denied that a civil judgment had been entered against him, that the Appellant paid the judgment on the day before the hearing, which was nearly nine months after it was entered, and that the outstanding judgment related to his profession. Therefore, even if the Appellant requested a formal hearing, the Board was within its rights to proceed informally.

Affirmed.

. We find no merit in the Appellant’s contention that license revocation was an excessively harsh punishment. Given the circumstances of this case, license revocation was within the permissible range of penalties for a violation of section 489.129(l)(q). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 61G4-17.001(l)(q)(2005).

. On appeal, counsel for the Board agrees that the Appellant filed an Election of Rights Form requesting a formal hearing and alleging the existence of disputed facts.


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Citator

Cited By

  • DeROIN v. State, 160 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …e thirty-day reporting period commenced. Because administrative cases involving disputed issues of material fact must be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, see § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat.; Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 958 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), we hold that Dr. DeRoin was entitled to a formal administrative proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for a formal hearing to determine when the written order was entered and whether Dr. DeRoin violated se…
  • …sting an informal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, or by failing to respond to the complaint at all, the facts of the complaint are deemed to be admitted.” (citations omitted)); Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 958 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“When material facts are not in dispute, an agency need not refer a matter to the Department of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing, even if such a hearing is requested by a party. It may, instead, proceed informal…

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