STEVE MESSER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Steve Messer appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine possession after a traffic stop. The court reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Messer's vehicle because he observed only ambiguous arm movements without seeing any actual exchange of contraband.
The stop was illegal because Officer Clark lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Messer was engaged in criminal activity, having observed only ambiguous arm movements without seeing any actual objects transferred. Additionally, any abandonment of the cocaine was involuntary as it was the product of an illegal stop, thus the evidence must be suppressed.
[1] A police officer's observation of arm movements between occupants of a vehicle and another individual, without seeing any objects transferred, does not establish reasonab…
[2] A stop based on a "bare" suspicion, rather than a "reasonable" suspicion, is illegal.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The most troublesome aspect of this matter, compelling reversal, is Officer Clark's admitted failure actually to have seen objects transferred between Messer and the alleged drug dealer.”
Establishes the critical factor for reversal—the lack of observation of actual contraband or money
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Clark observed Messer's pickup truck pull into a driveway and saw a black male approach the vehicle with apparent arm movements, but could not…
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FRANK, Judge.
Steve Messer, having pleaded nolo con-tendere to possession of cocaine, has appealed from the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the officers who stopped him did not have a reasonable suspicion that Messer was engaged in criminal activity, we reverse.
The facts before us appear to present a typical “drive-by” cocaine transaction. Hillsborough County police officer Joseph Clark observed Messer, in the seat of his pickup truck, pull into a driveway near the corner of East Robles and Floribraska. Through binoculars Clark saw a black male . approach Messer’s vehicle and appear to pass something to the occupants. Clark, however, saw only arm movement and could not identify any objects. Assuming that a drug sale had occurred, Clark radioed another unit which stopped Messer’s truck some thirty seconds later. The second officer, Quinones, upon walking up to the vehicle observed Messer drop a piece of rock cocaine out of the window of the truck. Quinones then arrested Messer for possession of cocaine. Messer moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that he was illegally stopped.
The most troublesome aspect of this matter, compelling reversal, is Officer Clark’s admitted failure actually to have seen objects transferred between Messer and the alleged drug dealer. Although the officer labeled these events a “transaction,” he admitted that, even with binoculars, he could see neither drugs nor money. Many of the cases dealing with drive-up drug sales in high crime neighborhoods hinge upon this factor. See State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Stanton v. State, 576 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 584 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1991); Stevenson v. State, 565 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In those instances where no contraband was observed, the officer was deemed to have had only a “bare” rather than a “reasonable” suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, the subsequent stop would be illegal.'
Another issue, argued by the state, is that Messer voluntarily abandoned the cocaine, thus attenuating the taint of the illegal stop. This question has been answered by the supreme court in State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla.1992): “An abandonment which is the product of an illegal stop is involuntary, and the abandoned property must be suppressed” (citing Stanley v. State, 327 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)).
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying suppression is reversed.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Burnette v. State, 658 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ther money or drugs before stopping him. Although our court has indicated a reluctance to approve of a stop and search by an officer who has not actually seen the money or drugs exchange hands in this kind of drive-up situation, see Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), other factors are important to our assessment of whether the stop is reasonable. Of significance are the officer’s narcotics experience; the reputation of the location for drive-…
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Belsky v. State, 831 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
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Coney v. State, 820 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…ransaction. Unlike the situations in D.A.H. and Revels, the officers here observed a single [*1015] suspicious event. They did not see Coney pass drugs or other contraband to the person in the car. See Burnette, 658 So. 2d at 1171; Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Both officers admitted that before Coney spit out the marijuana, they did not have probable cause to arrest him. One officer felt that he had a basis to search Coney. The second officer stated that he had reasonable suspicio…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1992)
- Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Stanley v. State, 327 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Stanton v. State, 576 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Stevenson v. State, 565 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)