RONALD BURNETTE, II, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ronald Burnette appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found during a traffic stop. The court reversed, finding that while the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on multiple factors including the known location's drug activity and observed hand-to-hand transaction, the subsequent arrest and search lacked probable cause because no drugs or money were actually observed in the exchange.
The court held that while the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's experience, the location's reputation, surveillance period, and previous arrests, the subsequent search was not supported by probable cause because no drugs, money, or other evidence of criminal activity were actually observed before the arrest.
[1] A hand-to-hand transaction observed by police, combined with the reputation of the location for drug activity and the officer's narcotics experience, may establish reason…
[2] Reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate does not automatically equate to probable cause to arrest.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although our court has indicated a reluctance to approve of a stop and search by an officer who has not actually seen the money or drugs exchange hands in this kind of drive-up situation, see Messer v. State, 609 So.2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); State v. Clark, 605 So.2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), other factors are important to our assessment of whether the stop is reasonable. Of significance are the officer's narcotics experience; the reputation of the location for drive-up transactions; the extended period of surveillance; and the history of previous multiple arrests from that site.”
Establishes the multi-factor test for evaluating reasonable suspicion for a stop despite lack of observed drug/money exchange
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Griffis was surveilling a house on 14th Avenue known for drug activity when he observed Burnette pull up in a car. Griffis saw Burnette engage…
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FRANK, Judge.
Ronald Burnette has appealed from the denial of his motion to suppress, after which he pleaded no contest and was placed on probation for possession of cocaine. We reverse.
On the night of Burnette’s arrest, Officer James Griffis of the St. Petersburg Police Department was, along with two other officers, focusing on a house on 14th Avenue, a location from which the police had made thirty or forty arrests in the past. A dealer who worked from that location, Johnny Lee Hall, was personally known to Officer Griffis. At about 10:45, watching with binoculars from a vantage point a half block away, Griffis observed Burnette pull up in a blue Chevrolet. Hall came out of the house, and Griffis saw Hall and Burnette engage in what he called a “hand-to-hand” transaction, although he did not actually see money or drugs change hands. Griffis then radioed ahead to two other officers, who stopped Burnette’s car and found the cocaine.
Burnette has contended that we must reverse because the police never observed either money or drugs before stopping him. Although our court has indicated a reluctance to approve of a stop and search by an officer who has not actually seen the money or drugs exchange hands in this kind of drive-up situation, see Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), other factors are important to our assessment of whether the stop is reasonable. Of significance are the officer’s narcotics experience; the reputation of the location for drive-up transactions; the extended period of surveillance; and the history of previous multiple arrests from that site. In this case, all of these factors, together with the nature of the exchange between Burnette and a known dealer, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion in Officer Griffis that Burnette had engaged in illegal activity. See Walker v. State, 636 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); State v. Caicedo, 622 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). As in Clark, 605 So. 2d at 596, Griffis “perceived a situation that justified an investigatory stop when measured by [his] training, experience, and knowledge.”
The critical problem in this case, however, is that something more than the founded suspicion necessary to stop and investigate is needed to give rise to probable cause to arrest. The trial judge specifically stopped short of finding that probable cause to arrest existed, and from the record we cannot discern that it did. All we know is that Griffis radioed ahead and other officers arrested Burnette. We do not know that anything further occurred after the stop but before a search — for example, observation of the cocaine or confession by the defendant— that would give rise to probable cause for an arrest and incident search. We cannot find the search of Burnette or his vehicle supported by probable cause.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
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State v. Hankerson, 65 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 2011)…(Fla. 2d DCA 2001); League v. State, 778 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); State v. Gandy, 766 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); D.A.H. v. State, 718 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. K.S., 694 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Burnette v. State, 658 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Walker v. State, 636 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) State v. Caicedo, 622 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Elliott v. State, 597 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Winters v. State, 578 So. 2d5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).…
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Revels v. State, 666 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ALTENBERND, Judge. James Revels appeals his conviction for possession of crack cocaine, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed the cocaine as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Although this ease is similar to Burnette v. State, 658 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), in which the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant, we conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Revels in this case. On the evening of January 3, 1994, the St. Petersburg Police Department assigned two e…1 / 2
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Huffman v. State, 937 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…In support of his motion, Huffman cited, as pertinent to the issues, Coney v. State, 820 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); State v. A.M., 788 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Abdullah v. State, 745 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); and Burnette v. State, 658 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Lt. Jimmy Anderson, a member of the Chief-land Police Department. Finding that the officer had sufficient lawful grounds to act as he did, the trial court orally denied the motion t…
Previewing 3 of 26 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Walker v. State, 636 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- State v. Caicedo, 622 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of G.F., 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)