GLENN JOHN SAARE, APPELLANT,
v.
DOROTHY RUTH SAARE, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's treatment of appreciation in the marital home as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, but reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings regarding how non-marital assets (rental properties) became marital assets or to properly apply the special equity formula.
The court affirmed that appreciation in the marital home was properly treated as a marital asset valued at $20,000, but reversed the distribution of equity in the rental properties because the trial court failed to make findings regarding whether and how these non-marital assets became marital assets, and did not apply the correct special equity formula.
[1] Appreciation in value of a marital home, titled solely in one spouse's name, can be considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
[2] The enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution or expenditure of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution or expenditure of marital funds constitute marital assets of the parties.”
Establishes the legal principle governing when non-marital property appreciation becomes divisible marital property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGlenn and Dorothy Saare were parties to a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The husband owned a marital home titled solely in his name, which apprec…
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[*629] SMITH, Judge.
The husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution. We affirm without discussion the trial court’s award of personal property and attorney’s fees to the wife. Further, we agree that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in determining that the appreciation in value of the parties’ marital home, titled solely in the husband’s name, was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution and that this asset had the value of $20,000. § 61.-075(3)(a)2., Fla.Stat. (1989); Young v. Young, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA1992). However, because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the remainder of its equitable distribution plan to permit intelligent appellate review, we are compelled to reverse the remainder of the final judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Upon remand, the trial court shall identify the marital assets and non-marital assets. The enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution or expenditure of marital funds constitute marital assets of the parties. Section 61.-075(3)(a)2.; Crapps v. Crapps, 501 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1987); and Sanders v. Sanders, 492 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA1986) appeal after remand 547 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA1989). Should the court determine that the husband is entitled to a special equity in some or all of the properties at issue below, the correct formula for computing such special equity is contained in Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA1991) and cases cited therein.1
This recitation of law should not be construed by the trial court or parties as a directive limiting the court to equitable distribution of marital assets. Upon remand, the trial judge shall not be precluded from choosing another remedy, such as lump sum alimony, to accomplish equity between the parties. As the remedies available to the trial court are interrelated, the trial court may revisit all the awards if necessary to achieve equity, including the award to the husband of a valuable membership in a local yacht club. See § 61.075(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989); see also Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1991).
In lieu of further proceedings, which we have reluctantly ordered in this case because of technical errors or omissions in the final judgment,2 the parties are encouraged to attempt settlement of their difficulties, since further litigation will serve little purpose other than to further deplete the available assets of the parties.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings.
SHIVERS and KAHN, JJ., concur. . The computations contained in the husband’s brief are rejected as the husband utilized the formula for determining a special equity in en-tireties property, Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1983), and the rental property at issue herein is titled solely in the husband’s name.
. The trial court apparently overlooked the evidence concerning the husband’s purchase of various rental properties prior to the marriage, which were titled solely in the husband's name, yet in the final judgment the trial court distributed the equity in these properties as if the same were marital assets, without any finding as to how, or whether, such properties became marital assets.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Brock v. Newman Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…tuting the final judgment.10 If necessary, and appropriate, the trial judge may take additional testimony to determine proper valuation of assets, and liabilities. See Cortez-Williams v. Douglass, 659 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Saare v. Saare, 610 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Nicewonder v. Nicewonder, 602 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In addition, the trial court may reconsider the alimony award and its denial of attorney fees and costs to the former wife, since these awards are necessarily part o…
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Strickland v. Garland Strickland, 670 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…ting either from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both” is a marital asset. Section 61.075(5)(a)2., Fla.Stat. See Saare v. Saare, 610 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Young v. Young, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In addition, appellee has directed us to no record support for the $20,000 figure for the improvements, and I have located none in reviewing the record. Finally, evidence of t…
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Pleas v. Pleas, 652 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…n it. “The enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution or expenditure of marital funds constitute marital assets of the parties.” Saare v. Saare, 610 So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). [Wjhere a party has separately owned property on which marital funds or labor were expended during the marriage, the value of the property at the time that it was acquired, together with any reasonable proration of the app…
Authorities Cited
- Sumner Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983)
- Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1991)
- Crapps v. P.C. Crapps, III, 501 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Sanders v. Dorsey A. Sanders, 547 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Fla. Dep't of Env't Reg. v. Fla. Sugar Cane League, Inc., 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Sanders v. Dorsey A. Sanders, Jr., 492 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)