ELEANOR STRICKLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
GARLAND STRICKLAND, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1996-03-20
No. 95-429
LAWRENCE, J., concurs., JOANOS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
670 So. 2d 142 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases


Opinion of the Court
MICKLE, Judge.

MICKLE, Judge.

This is an appeal fi’om a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We affirm. The challenged judgment comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness. We conclude that the record supports the award of permanent alimony. Likewise, we believe that the able trial judge, when presented with a complicated record of transactions involving multiple marriages and the parties’ individual and joint properties, achieved a fair result that accords with the requirements of the equitable distribution statute, section 61.075, Florida Statutes. Ugarte v. Ugarte, 608 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (appellate panel is to consider the overall scheme of distribution devised by the trial court in a dissolution action to achieve equity between the parties, and piecemeal review is inappropriate), cause dism., 617 So. 2d 322 (Fla.1993).

AFFIRMED.

LAWRENCE, J., concurs.

JOANOS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

Other
JOANOS, Judge,

JOANOS, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

There is merit in one of the three issues appellant raises. One of the assets at issue in equitable distribution was a house (the “LeBrun house”) which appellant had owned before she and appellee married in 1967, and which was titled in her name alone. As such, the LeBrun house was a nonmarital asset as defined by section 61.075(5)(b)l., Florida Statutes: “[ajssets acquired ... by either party prior to the marriage.... ” There was evidence that the value of this house at the time of dissolution was about $55,000, but no evidence was presented as to the value of the house in 1967 or at any other time. Appellee testified to making various physical improvements to the LeBrun house.

The trial court found that appellee had made some $20,000 in improvements to this house, and on that basis found that it was a marital asset.

That appellee made some improvements to the LeBrun house does not transform it into a marital asset. Rather, “[t]he enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both” is a marital asset.

Section 61.075(5)(a)2., Fla.Stat. See Saare v. Saare, 610 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Young v. Young, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In addition, appellee has directed us to no record support for the $20,000 figure for the improvements, and I have located none in reviewing the record.

Finally, evidence of the value of improvements made to the house is not necessarily the equivalent of evidence of enhancement in value of the house.

The record contains no evidence as to the enhancement in value of the LeBrun house due to appellee’s efforts.

Therefore, I would reverse on this point and remand for a finding that the LeBrun house is a nonmarital asset, and for further findings as to the enhancement in value of the house during the marriage and what portion of that enhancement is a marital asset, after taking such further evidence as is necessary to make these findings. After making such findings, the trial court would be directed to adjust the distribution scheme in the final judgment as required by the findings.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2010)
    …oes not transform the entire asset into a marital asset; rather, it is only the ‘enhancement in value and appreciation’ which becomes a marital asset.” Martin v. Martin, 923 So. 2d 1236, 1238-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (quoting Strickland v. Strickland, 670 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). Moreover, we emphasize that the trial court must make a finding of fact that the non-owner spouse made contributions to the nonmarital property during the course of the marriage. While these contributions need not be stric…
  • Grace "Olivia" Martin v. Martin, 923 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …vements or expenditures of marital funds to a nonmarital asset does not transform the entire asset into a mari [*1239] tal asset; rather, it is only the “enhancement in value and appreciation” which becomes a marital asset. Strickland v. Strickland, 670 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Accordingly, to make an award for the enhancement in value and appreciation of a nonmarital asset, the court must make specific findings as to the value of such enhancement and appreciation during the marriage, as well as w…
  • Wilson v. Wilson, 992 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
    …nditures of marital funds to a nonmarital asset does not transform the entire asset into a marital asset; rather, it is only the ‘enhancement in value and appreciation’ that becomes a marital asset.” Id. at 1238-39 (quoting Strickland v. Strickland, 670 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). Here, based on its finding that Mrs. Bell transferred the Motel property to the former wife as a gift during the marriage, the trial court was correct when it determined that the former wife’s interest in the Motel consti…

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw