THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
FRANCIS H. KESTER, RESPONDENT
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Florida sought certiorari review of an appellate court's reversal of a trial court's denial of a DUI defendant's motion to dismiss. The State of Florida Supreme Court held that circumstantial evidence (the defendant's vehicle at the accident scene, paint matching, physical signs of intoxication, and the defendant's own statements) was sufficient to establish corpus delicti for DUI, even absent independent evidence of driving beyond the defendant's confession.
The court held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish corpus delicti in a DUI case and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required at the corpus delicti stage. The officer's observations—the defendant's vehicle at the accident scene, matching paint, the defendant standing alone beside his car, bloodshot eyes, and alcohol on his breath—collectively constituted sufficient evidence tending to show the crime was committed.
[1] A confession alone is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of a crime without independent evidence corroborating the occurrence of the crime.
[2] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the corpus delicti of a crime.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An individual's confession to a crime is insufficient evidence of a criminal act where no independent evidence exists to substantiate the occurrence of the crime.”
Establishes the foundational principle that corpus delicti cannot rest solely on a defendant's confession; independent corroborating evidence is required.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA Miami police officer responded to an accident where a child on a bike was struck by a vehicle. Three bystanders witnessed the accident and confirmed…
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NESBITT, Judge.
The state seeks issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing an opinion of the circuit court, appellate division, which reversed a trial court’s denial of Francis H. Kester’s motion to dismiss the driving under the influence charge brought against him. We grant the petition and. quash the order under review.
A City of Miami police officer was dispatched to an accident involving a child struck by an auto. When the officer arrived at the scene, three bystanders confirmed they were witnesses and that Kes-ter’s auto, through no fault of his own, had struck the child on his bike; however, all three witnesses refused to testify or give their names. The officer observed Kes-ter’s parked vehicle on the roadside with a child’s damaged bike lying nearby. Kester was standing outside his vehicle. Blue paint, the color of the bike was on the side of his car. When approached by the officer, Kester talked to the officer, admitting he struck the child. The officer noted Kes-ter emanated a strong odor of alcohol and exhibited bloodshot eyes. After observing these signs, the officer advised Kester that he had completed the accident investigation and was beginning a criminal investigation.
Kester was arrested for DUI. A blood alcohol reading of .22 was taken. Kester filed a motion to dismiss alleging the state failed to establish the corpus delicti of DUI, specifically that the state could not establish that he had been driving at the time of the accident.
The trial court entered an order denying Kester’s motion to dismiss. Kester entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. In the circuit court, appellate division, Kester appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the appellate division reversed the order. Here, the state seeks the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the appellate division’s opinion and requests this court to order the appellate division to affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss. An individual’s confession to a crime is insufficient evidence of a criminal act where no independent evidence exists to substantiate the occurrence of the crime. State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823 (Fla.1976).
Kester claims the state has no evidence, other than his confession, that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. In proving corpus delicti, however, circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla.1991); cert. granted in part, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 436, 116 L.Ed.2d 455 (1991); judgment vacated on other grounds, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992); Buenoano v. State, 527 So. 2d 194 (Fla.1988).
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary. Sochor, 580 So. 2d at 600; Stano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986).
To go forward, the state had to present evidence tending to show that a crime had been committed, not proof of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer’s testimony was that Kester’s green auto was the only car on the scene and a mangled blue bike was on the ground nearby. Blue paint, the same color as on the bike, was on the side of Kester’s car. Kes-ter was the only person standing next to his car. There were no passengers. The officer had observed Kester's bloodshot eyes and the scent of alcohol on Kester’s breath. Through this evidence, the state met its burden of tending to show Kester had committed the crime of DUI.
Once a prima facie case was presented, the trial court correctly held that Kester’s statement that he had been driving and hit the child, was admissible, and not protected as argued by Kester. The accident report privilege in effect at the time of the incident specifically provided that the privilege does not extend to statements disclosing “the identity of a person involved in an accident when such identity is not otherwise known.” § 316.066(4), Fla.Stat. (1987). See Sylvester v. State, 557 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA), cause dismissed, 562 So. 2d 347 (Fla.1990); see also Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983).
Accordingly, the state’s petition is granted. The opinion of the circuit court appellate division is quashed and the cause remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (U.S. 1992)
- State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1976)
- Stano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985)
- Judias v. Buenoano, 527 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1988)
- McKenna v. Nevada, 474 U.S. 1093 (U.S. 1986)
- Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991)
- T.M. v. State, 557 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)