ELAINE NICHOLS AND DUANE NICHOLS, APPELLANTS,
v.
ANTHONY MARTELL, AURELIO MARTELL, AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Plaintiffs Elaine and Duane Nichols appealed a trial court's enforcement of an alleged settlement agreement in a negligence action arising from an automobile accident. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that while a settlement agreement was formed, the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on whether plaintiffs' counsel had authority to settle without consent of their uninsured motorist carrier.
The court held that a valid settlement agreement was formed by the exchange of letters, as plaintiffs' March 12 letter was an offer to settle for the policy limits and defendants' March 19 response was an acceptance. However, the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the threshold question of whether plaintiffs' counsel possessed authority from his clients to make the settlement offer.
[1] A letter offering to settle a lawsuit for the defendant's insurance policy limits, with a threat of a bad faith action for failure to settle, constitutes a settlement off…
[2] A response tendering the policy limits and enclosing settlement documents constitutes an acceptance of a settlement offer, not a counteroffer.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the March 12, 1991 letter sent by plaintiffs' counsel to defense counsel in this case was not, as plaintiffs urge, an invitation to make an offer to settle the instant lawsuit — but was, in fact, an offer to settle the lawsuit for the $10,000 liability policy limits”
Establishes that the initial letter constituted a definite settlement offer rather than an invitation for offers
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing an automobile accident, plaintiffs' counsel sent a March 12, 1991 letter to defense counsel offering to settle for the $10,000 liability pol…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs Elaine and Duane Nichols from a final order enforcing an alleged settlement agreement in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident. We reverse in part.
First, we conclude that the March 12, 1991 letter sent by plaintiffs’ counsel to defense counsel in this case was not, as plaintiffs urge, an invitation to make an offer to settle the instant lawsuit — but was, in fact, an offer to settle the lawsuit for the $10,000 liability policy limits of the defendants’ insurance policy, else the plaintiffs would seek a “bad faith” action against the defendant insurer for failure to settle within the policy limits.
Moreover, the March 19, 1991 letter of defendants’ counsel to plaintiffs’ counsel clearly accepts this offer by tendering the $10,000 policy limits to settle the case and enclosing the usual settlement documents to finalize the settlement; this letter was not, as urged, a counteroffer in any sense. Stated differently, there was an ostensible settlement agreement entered into by the parties in this case. See Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384 (Fla.1985); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404 (Fla.1974); Dorson v. Dorson, 393 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
Second, we conclude that the sworn claim of plaintiffs’ counsel on rehearing that he had no authority from the plaintiffs to settle the instant lawsuit [without the consent of the plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist carrier] — required the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing thereon as requested by the plaintiffs’ counsel on rehearing. Indeed, defense counsel on appeal has candidly and commendably agreed that such an evidentiary hearing should have been held under these circumstances. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 46-47 (Fla.1966); Wiskeman v.
First Bank of Hollywood Beach, 405 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Berrol v. Concord Fla., Inc., 305 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). The final order under review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the plaintiffs’ counsel had the authority from the plaintiffs to make the above-stated offer to settle the instant lawsuit. If plaintiffs’ counsel had the required authority from his clients to make the offer to settle the instant lawsuit, the settlement agreement should be enforced; if not, the settlement agreement should be set aside.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Mercury Ins. Co. OF Fla. v. Fonseca, 3 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…. 861 (1889). The demand letter sent by Fonseca’s counsel is not unique and the question of whether it constitutes an offer has already been answered by this Court. Peraza v. Robles, 983 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); see Nichols v. Martell, 612 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (finding that a similar demand letter was more than a mere invitation to settle). The demand letter in Peraza stated “Please tender the policy limits within fifteen (15) days or we will consider [the insurance company] is act…
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Peraza v. Robles, 983 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…nd the UM carrier subrogation waiver — did not demonstrate an effective acceptance of Pera-za’s offer. Because the documents demanded in MGA’s response were not shown to be “usual settlement documents” implicit in any settlement, Nichols v. Martell, 612 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Erhardt v. Duff, 729 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Boyko v. Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), and thus, constituted a separate additional requirement that conditioned the settlement on the submission of…1 / 2
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Grant v. Lyons, 17 So. 3d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…turn into counteroffers either by adding additional terms or not meeting the terms of the original offer. Generally, an insurance company that accepts an offer can require the plaintiff to sign the “usual settlement documents.” Nichols v. Martell, 612 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). “Traditionally, general releases have included expansive language designed to protect the offeror from unforeseen developments or creative maneuvering by the other party.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Robbie v. City OF Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1985)
- Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1974)
- Dorson v. Gertrude Dorson, 393 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Berrol v. Concord Fla., Inc., 305 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Wiskeman v. First Bank OF Hollywood Beach, 405 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)