JOHN PETER RANDALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this direct criminal appeal, the court affirmed appellant's conviction for purchase of cocaine but reversed his sentence as a habitual felony offender because the trial court failed to make the statutorily required findings to support such a sentence. The case was remanded for resentencing.
The court held that because the trial court failed to make the findings required by § 775.084(1)(a)1. and 2., the sentence as a habitual felony offender must be reversed. The court noted that the written order incorrectly included misdemeanor convictions in establishing prior felonies, and there was no finding regarding the five-year temporal requirement.
[1] A conviction will be affirmed if challenges raised to it are without merit.
[2] A sentence as an habitual felony offender requires findings that the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more felonies and that the current offense was comm…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Among the conditions precedent to imposition of a sentence as an habitual felony offender are findings that '[t]he defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses'; and that '[t]he felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony or other qualified offense of which he was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified [*94] offense, whichever is later.'”
Establishes the statutory requirements for habitual felony offender sentencing that must be found by the trial court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn Peter Randall was convicted of purchase of cocaine. At sentencing, the state offered evidence of prior felony convictions, and the trial court en…
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PER CURIAM.
In this direct criminal appeal, appellant seeks review of his conviction of purchase of cocaine, and of his sentence as an habitual felony offender. We find the challenges raised to the conviction to be without merit, and affirm the conviction without further discussion. However, because the trial court failed to make all of the findings necessary to support a sentence as an habitual felony offender, we are constrained to reverse appellant’s sentence and to remand for resentencing.
Among the conditions precedent to imposition of a sentence as an habitual felony offender are findings that “[t]he defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses”; and that “[t]he felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony or other qualified offense of which he was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release, on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later.” § 775.-084(l)(a)l. & 2., Fla.Stat. (1991). The record contains no such findings by the trial court.
There is an indication in the record that, at the sentencing hearing, the state offered certified copies of prior felony convictions into evidence. However, no such documents appear in the record; nor did the trial court find during the sentencing hearing that appellant had committed any such offenses. The trial court did enter a written “Order Determining Habitual Felony Offender.” That Order contains the finding that:
1.The Defendant has previously been convicted of two (2) or more felonies in this state, to-wit:
1. Possession of Marijuana less than 20 grams, 2 Counts; Case No. [sic], Escam-bia County, FL; July 31, 1980;
2. Possession of Cocaine, Case No. 87-5254, Leon County, FL; May 25, 1988; and
3. Possession of Paraphernalia, Case No. 87-5254, Leon County, FL; May 25, 1988.
However, of the three prior offenses listed, only possession of cocaine is a felony. § 893.13(l)(f), Fla.Stat. (1987). Possession of less than twenty grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia are both misdemeanors. § 893.13(l)(f), Fla. Stat. (1979); § 893.147(1), Fla.Stat. (1987).
Because the trial court failed to make the findings required by section 775.084(l)(a)l. and 2., Florida Statutes (1991), we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. On remand, the trial court may again sentence appellant as an habitual felony offender if it makes all of the required findings, and the evidence supports those findings. E.g., King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
ERVIN, BOOTH and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
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Sinclair v. State, 853 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…herwise that the prior convictions were appellant’s, both of which were essential to the imposition of PRR sentences.2 In Sinclair I, we cited Boyd v. State, 776 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 792 So. 2d 1213 (Fla.2001); Randall v. State, 613 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); and King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), as an aid to the state and trial court. Nevertheless, on remand, the state failed to cure these evi-dentiary errors in proof and the trial court again imposed PRR sentences…
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Sinclair v. State, 812 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…again sentence appellant as a prison re-leasee reoffender if it makes the required findings and the evidence supports those findings. See Boyd v. State, 776 So. 2d 317 [*595] (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 792 So. 2d 1213 (Fla.2001); Randall v. State, 613 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). ERVIN, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.…
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McGlaun v. Dixon (N.D. Fla. 2024)…the imprisonment portion of that judgment when he filed the habeas 182 So. 3d 889, 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (holding that an HFO enhancement was illegal if one of the two predicate offenses was actually a misdemeanor); Randall v. State, 613 So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (same, where two of the three predicate offenses were misdemeanors, including possession of paraphernalia). 7 ---PAGE 8--- Case 5:24-cv-00045-TKW-ZCB Document 18 Filed 10/21/24 petition); Boone v. Warden, Att'y Gen.,…
Authorities Cited
- King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)