SIMON DWAYNE SINCLAIR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Simon Sinclair appeals PRR (prison releasee reoffender) sentences imposed after remand from a previous appeal. The court reverses again, finding the state failed to cure evidentiary deficiencies identified in the prior decision, specifically the lack of legally sufficient evidence regarding his release date and proof that he was the person subject to the prior convictions.
The court reverses the sentences and remands for resentencing because the state failed to cure the evidentiary deficiencies identified in the prior appeal, specifically the lack of proper proof regarding the release date and failure to establish that Sinclair was the person named in the prior convictions.
[1] Sentences imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) Act must be supported by legally sufficient evidence.
[2] A prior appellate ruling that evidence was insufficient to support PRR sentences mandates resentencing if the state fails to cure the evidentiary defects on remand.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state had failed to offer legally sufficient evidence to support the imposition of sentences under the PRR act. The state had relied solely on hearsay evidence regarding appellant's release date from prison, and had failed to prove through a fingerprint expert or otherwise that the prior convictions were appellant's, both of which were essential to the imposition of PRR sentences.”
Establishes the two critical evidentiary failures identified in the prior appeal that the state was required to cure on remand.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSinclair was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under Florida law. In a prior appeal (Sinclair I), this court had reversed and remanded for res…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prison Releasee Reoffender (Prr) Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Simon Sinclair appeals the sentences imposed upon him as a prison releasee reof-fender (PRR), contending that the sentences were based exactly on the same evidence, admitted over objection, that this court had previously decided was insufficient to support such sentences. See Sinclair v. State, 812 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (Sinclair I). We agree and once again reverse the sentences and remand the case for resentencing.
In Sinclair I, this court affirmed appellant’s convictions, but reversed and remanded for resentencing, because the state had failed to offer legally sufficient evidence to support the imposition of sentences under the PRR act.1 The state had relied solely on hearsay evidence regarding appellant’s release date from prison, and had failed to prove through a fingerprint expert or otherwise that the prior convictions were appellant’s, both of which were essential to the imposition of PRR sentences.2 In Sinclair I, we cited Boyd v. State, 776 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 792 So. 2d 1213 (Fla.2001); Randall v. State, 613 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); and King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), as an aid to the state and trial court. Nevertheless, on remand, the state failed to cure these evidentiary errors in proof and the trial court again imposed PRR sentences based upon legally insufficient evidence.
In reversing appellant’s sentences, we reject the state’s argument that this case should be affirmed under Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980), and Smith v. State, 461 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Appellant’s counsel in this case properly lodged objections based on the ground of hearsay as to the release date stated in the probation order allegedly signed by appellant3 and the criminal judgment, due to the fact that the probation officer was not the custodian of the judgment, and on the ground that there was no proof that appellant was the same person named on the judgment for the prior convictions. The latter factual issue goes to the truth of the material relied upon for the imposition of the PRR sentences and distinguishes this case from Eutsey and Smith.
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.
ERVIN, BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur. . § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).
. These facts were not recited in Sinclair I. Rather, they are found in the record of the earlier case, and we of course may appropriately take judicial notice of the records in former appeals. See Barry Hinnant, Inc. v. Spottswood, 481 So. 2d 80, 81 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
.This probation order is not part of the record and does not appear to have been admitted into evidence.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Gray v. State, 910 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…his crime occurred within three years of his release from prison, proof of the release date is “an essential requirement for sentencing pursuant to the PRR Act.” Glover v. State, 871 So. 2d 1025, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); see also Sinclair v. State, 853 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding competent proof of appellant’s release date from prison “essential to the imposition of [a] PRR sentence[ ]”). The State had the burden of proving Mr. Gray’s release date based on competent evidence. See id.; cf. Bo…
-
Env't Confederation OF Sw. Fla., Inc. v. IMC Phosphates, Inc., 857 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…controversy that had either not been alleged or was incapable of being alleged. In so concluding, I have relied on the records in both the present appeal and in Environmental Confederation II, which may be judicially noticed. See Sinclair v. State, 853 So. 2d 551 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The pertinent facts in both cases are hereafter summarized. In Environmental Confederation II, appellants, on August 14, 2002, filed their declaratory-judgment suit, asserting the constitutional invalidity of section 403.4…
-
Scheffer v. State, 893 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…to the State’s response below, that motion was denied because the record showed that the court imposed a sentence of twenty-four months, which was the agreed sentence. This court can take judicial notice of its own records. See Sinclair v. State, 853 So. 2d 551, 552 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Fyler v. State, 852 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 860 So. 2d 977 (Fla.2003). Our records contain a copy of Scheffer’s plea and sentencing transcript from the prior appeal. That transcript shows clearly…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Boyd v. State, 776 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Barry Hinnant, Inc. v. Spottswood, 481 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Brooks v. State, 461 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Kurtis Smith v. State, 461 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Randall v. State, 613 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Sinclair v. State, 812 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)